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ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores the mechanisms by which civilian oversight of the police seeks
to improve the accountability, transparency, trustworthiness, and, ultimately, the
legitimacy of law enforcement. This exploration involves case studies of civilian
oversight mechanisms in Los Angeles, New York City, and Kansas City. In the Kansas
City case, I employed survey research and interviews to assess the attitudes and
experiences of relevant actors. I found some evidence that civilian oversight can improve
accountability, transparency, and trust. However, for oversight to produce the desired
effects, citizen boards must have sufficient legal authority as well as appropriate staffing,
budgets, and cooperation from police departments and unions. Unfortunately, such
cooperation is not easily achieved.
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INTRODUCTION

Ever since the beating of motorist Rodney King by officers of the Los Angeles Police
Department was televised nationally in March of 1991, the use of excessive force by law
enforcement has been a salient national issue. The advent of smart phones with cameras has
only increased the saliency of the issue, as encounters between police and citizens are now likely
to be recorded and publicized. Recent years have witnessed a series of incidents in which police
used deadly force while making arrests, arguably without necessity or justification. Some of the
more prominent incidents of citizens being subjected to deadly force by the police are Michael
Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, 2014; Eric Garner in Staten Island, New York, 2014; Laquan
McDonald in Chicago, 2014; and Terry Williams in Milwaukee, 2017. In each of these cases,
the officers were white and the citizens subjected to deadly force were black. All of these cases
produced intense criticism in the media as well as massive unrest in urban communities.
In Ferguson, Missouri, the killing of Michael Brown by a police officer in August 2014
sparked days of protests that turned violent at points. It was during the Ferguson protests that the
nation became aware of Black Lives Matter, a national advocacy group formed to combat what it
perceived as unjustified use of force by police against African-American citizens. As Black
Lives Matter conducted numerous protests in cities across the United States, racially-biased
policing became a national political issue, and the legitimacy of law enforcement was called into
question. It is fair to say that the law enforcement establishment today is facing a crisis of
legitimacy due in large part to the highly-publicized incidents in which police used deadly force
against citizens (Nix, Campbell, Byers, & Alpert, 2017).
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“Policing in the United States is in crisis, a ‘perfect storm’ of popular protest and media
coverage of egregious violations” (Epp et al., 2017, p.168). Law enforcement is facing a
“defining moment” in which it must embrace changes in order to restore its legitimacy (Police
Executive Research Forum, 2016, p.119).
Police officers who use excessive force in making arrests violate the constitutional rights
of citizens, in particular the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures
(Graham v. Connor, 1989). An officer who violates the constitutional rights of a citizen by using
excessive force in making an arrest is subject to criminal prosecution and/or civil liability under
the federal and state civil rights statutes. The officer is also subject to criminal prosecution under
state law for assault and battery or, in the case of deadly force, some form of homicide.
However, criminal prosecutions of police officers by state authorities are uncommon and
convictions are rare (Ross, 2019). Officers suspected of using excessive force are typically not
indicted, in most cases because local prosecutors decline to take these cases before grand juries.
When indictments are handed down, officers are often found not guilty.
Between 2014 to 2016, there were thirteen high-profile cases around the nation involving
the use of deadly force by police. In only seven of these cases were police officers indicted, and
as of 2016, none of these indictments had led to convictions (Park & Lee, 2017, para 2).
The Washington Post conducted an in-depth analysis of officer shootings in 2015. Their
research found that of the 965 people who were shot by police, 564 were armed with a gun, 281
had a different weapon, and 90 were unarmed (Kindy, Fisher, Tate, and Jenkins, 2015). Another
Washington Post study found that, since 2005, there were thousands of fatal police shootings.
From those thousands, most officers were acquitted and only 54 were charged. Of those 54, only
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11 were convicted and in most of the cases the officers were white and the victims were black
(Kindy & Kelly, 2015)
Of course, there are internal police department sanctions available to penalize officers
who employ excessive force, violate citizens’ rights, or otherwise violate departmental policies.
Traditionally, when a complaint is filed against a police officer, the Internal Affairs office of the
police department conducts an investigation. During the pendency of the investigation, the
officer is usually suspended with pay or reassigned to a ‘desk job’ that removes him or her from
the streets. While police officers often resent and fear internal affairs investigations, internal
affairs inquiries usually vindicate officers. A recent example of this occurred in Seattle,
Washington.
In 2014 Seattle Police Officer Adley Shepherd punched a woman, Miyello DurdenBosley, in the face as she sat handcuffed in the back of the officer’s car. She supposedly kicked
the officer in the jaw as she was shoved into the car. Since the patrol car’s video captured this,
the officer was placed on administrative leave for 29 months and then fired by then-Chief
Kathleen O’Toole in 2016. It took almost two years for the officer to be fired due to various
legal delays.
The Seattle Police Officers Guild along with the city chose an arbitrator to settle the
case. The arbitrator decided the firing was too severe and the termination was
cancelled. However, the King County Superior Court vacated the arbitrator’s decision, and the
firing was reinstated. The judge quoted from the police department manual which says, “An
officer may not use physical force: To punish or retaliate on handcuffed or otherwise restrained
subjects except in exceptional circumstances when the subject’s actions must be immediately
stopped to prevent injury, escape, or destruction of property” (komonews.com, 2019, para 20).
3

The police maintain that they have “the responsibility and the capacity to handle their
own affairs, especially when it involves discipline, and they consider complaints as hostile acts
on the part of citizens” (Walker, 2005, p. 16). Internal Affairs investigations and decisionmaking processes are not shared with the complainants or the civilian community. This lack of
transparency, coupled with the fact that officers generally are not held accountable for violations
of departmental policies and procedures, can lead to suspicion and distrust in the community and
contribute to a perception, especially in inner cities, that the police are enemies to be resisted.
Because police departments typically rule in favor of the police officer in many citizen
complaints, it raises the question as to whether the police can investigate a complaint against one
of their own in a fair and unbiased manner. In urban communities, especially among minority
groups, there is a longstanding belief that the Internal Affairs units cannot be counted on to
insure police accountability. However, this belief is not limited to inner-city communities. A
national survey conducted by the Pew Research Center and reported in USA Today in August
2014 found that 65% of respondents believed that police departments do a poor or fair job of
holding police officers accountable for misconduct; only 30% indicated that departments do a
good or excellent job in this regard (Ofer, 2016). “A separate 2014 poll found that while a large
majority of Americans (78%) have a favorable view of the police, only 46% believe that police
officers are held accountable for wrongdoing” (Ofer, 2016, p.1034).
One major hurdle for police accountability is that citizens often don’t bother to
file complaints because they don’t think their concerns would be taken seriously.
There is little motivation for police departments to encourage civilians to
complain, experts say, and many internal affairs officers either implicitly or

4

explicitly make it difficult for citizens to air their grievances (Reilly, 2015, para
4).

In Baltimore, a city plagued by conflict between the police and the inner-city community,
the police department has been slow to address allegations of misconduct. Research by the
Baltimore Sun found that 76 police misconduct cases since 2016 have expired without any
conclusions (Rector, 2019). “Critics of the police department have said its failure to fully
investigate every complaint against officers is evidence it cannot be trusted to hold itself
accountable and needs outside oversight” (Rector, 2019, para 3).
To highlight the seriousness of this issue, President Obama signed an executive order in
2015 establishing The President’s Task Force on 21 st Century Policing. The Task Force report
noted that, “Building trust and nurturing legitimacy on both sides of the police/citizen divide is
the foundational principle underlying the nature of relations between law enforcement agencies
and the communities they serve.” (The President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 2015, p.
26).
One of the reforms aimed at restoring trust and improving police accountability is the
creation of civilian oversight boards. Such boards, ideally composed of people representing their
community, are empowered to investigate complaints of police misconduct. In 1964, five years
before he became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Judge Warren E. Burger, called for the
establishment of civilian oversight agencies.
To accomplish the objective of maintaining lawful law enforcement calls for a
commission or board which is predominantly civilian, an external rather than an
internal police agency…Although such a review body would of necessity
5

cooperate with a police department, it must be independent of police
administration in the same sense – and for some of the same reasons – that courts
must be independent of prosecutors (Burger 1964, p. 16).

Judge Burger’s call was widely heeded, as numerous cities established police oversight
mechanisms. According to the National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement
(NACOLE), there are more than 200 civilian oversight agencies in the United States. Among
these agencies there are many different structures, oversight models, legal powers, and authority
to make final decisions regarding officer discipline (Stephens, Scrivner, & Cambieri, 2018).
There are three key models of civilian oversight: investigation-focused, review-focused,
and auditor/monitor focused. All models have potential strengths and weaknesses, and a
city/county would need to research these models to find what might be appropriate. Although no
two review boards are identical, there are some characteristics that they all share: high
variability in structure, varying differences in authority, and a combination of models considered
hybrids.

Models of Civilian Oversight
Investigation-focused model. In this model of oversight, an independent board staffed by
civilians conducts its own investigations of complaints of police misconduct. Such boards vary
as to their powers to subpoena individuals and records. In general, after concluding their
investigations, their only power is to make recommendations to the police or local governing
bodies.
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Auditor/monitor model. The auditor/monitor model is more focused on a broader perspective
than merely complaints, for example, what patterns are used in investigations, findings, and
discipline. Sometimes the auditor/monitor will become involved in an active investigation.
Since this model has the authority to review police policies, practices, and deeper access to
departmental records, it can make recommendations on how the police department can improve.
However, the Chief of Police has to implement these recommendations, and unfortunately there
is no method to compel a police department to institute systemic changes. New York and LA
both have the auditor/monitor model.
Review-focused model. This model focuses on how well the internal affairs department handles
citizen complaints and usually consists of a board of volunteers to manage police activities.
Typically these citizen volunteers have very little expertise in police business. The public trust
can be enhanced when the complaint process becomes transparent, and the community can voice
their opinions at open review board meetings. With limited authority, this model may be less
independent of the police department and may not have the staff, resources, authority or money
to conduct their own investigation (DeAngelis, Rosenthal, & Buchner, 2016).
NACOLE offers communities many resources in how to create a police review board,
but, to date, there has been no clarification as to what makes a review board effective in its
oversight of law enforcement. There are various reasons why cities form civilian oversight
boards, but it is important to note that “… 49 percent of agencies’ oversight bodies were
established following high-profile incidents and 30 percent from concerns about violence”
(Stephens, Scrivner, & Cambareri, 2018, p. 27).
The need for civilian oversight of law enforcement was first realized in the 1960s due to
corruption, brutality, and inefficiency, but the idea did not become a part of American policing
7

until the 1980s (Walker, 2005) with the movement toward community policing. Community
policing entails cooperation between the police and the communities they serve. Citizens and
police can work together to improve the safety of the community, but only if the citizens
perceive the police as being legitimate. Collaboration is not possible in the absence of trust. “If
police are to maintain social order in a normatively justifiable manner, it is vital they be
considered legitimate by those they police” (Antrobus, Bradford, Murphy, & Sargeant, 2015, p.
152). When officers are discourteous and coercive with the public, citizens will perceive police
and police departments as not being legitimate (Terrill & Paoline, 2015). The President’s Task
Force on 21st Century Policing noted that civilian oversight is critical in order to strengthen the
community’s trust and each community needs to identify what structure that oversight should be
(The President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing).

Effectiveness of Civilian Oversight
There is very little research assessing the effectiveness of civilian review boards. Walker and
Luna (2000) found that, despite having two civilian oversight agencies and a diverse police
force, officer-involved shootings in Albuquerque continued to be high relative to other cities. On
the other hand, Terrill and Ingram (2016) found that when police departments involve civilian
oversight agencies in the investigation of complaints against officers, the rate at which
complaints are sustained increases significantly. Most recently, Ali & Pirog (2019) found that
civilian oversight boards with a significant scope of authority can reduce racial disparities when
there is narrow discretion on the part of officers. But when boards have little authority and were
established for appearance only, they will have very little effect on police violence.
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Police Legitimacy
Ultimately, the key question is whether the creation of civilian oversight boards increases police
legitimacy. “Understanding the causes of citizen complaints can potentially assist in establishing
and preserving police legitimacy” (Terrill & Paoline, 2015, p. 193). The literature suggests that
legitimacy is a function of several factors, including trust, accountability, descriptive
representation, and procedural justice. Ideally, civilian oversight of police departments can
improve community-police interactions, increase police accountability to the community, and
enhance public perceptions of representation and procedural justice.

Concern for the Future of Policing
It is important that police be well-trained in the law, respectful of the rights of persons they
encounter, and held accountable when they violate the law and individual rights. However,
there is reason for concern about the effect of negative publicity on police morale and
recruitment. Moreover, it may be that officers are becoming more hesitant to do their job due to
the fear that their actions will be misinterpreted, that they will be subjected to intense media
scrutiny, which could lead to the loss of their job. This hesitancy has been dubbed the Ferguson
effect which is the idea that “officers are conscious of the negative publicity surrounding their
profession, understand that their actions could be recorded by the public at any given time, and
become less willing to do their job as a way to avoid being accused of racial profiling or
excessive force” (Wolfe & Nix, 2016, p. 1).
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Columbia, Missouri: Personal Experience
In November 2009 the City of Columbia, Missouri created its first Citizen Police Review Board.
After being appointed by the City Council to serve on the Board, I was elected by the Board
members to serve as chairman. I served in this capacity for two years, at which time my husband
and I moved to Knoxville, Tennessee. During my two years on the Board, we dealt with roughly
twenty complaints of police misconduct, including one highly publicized incident in 2010 in
which officers illegally entered a home and shot two dogs, killing one, in front of the family who
lived there. In about half of the cases brought before the Board, we recommended that the
officers involved be disciplined, but in no case did the Chief of Police accept our
recommendation. When we appealed to the city manager and the mayor, both of them supported
the Chief’s decision. This was a frustrating experience, but it piqued my interest in the topic of
civilian oversight of law enforcement.

A Roadmap to the Dissertation
In this dissertation I examine three cities that have created different mechanisms to ensure citizen
oversight of the police. I selected the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and the New
York City Police Department (NYPD) for their extensive history of police abuse. I chose Kansas
City because it has the oldest civilian review board in the United States. In all three cases, the
question is whether the oversight board has been effective in improving the antecedents of
legitimacy. With respect to Los Angeles and New York, I rely solely on secondary sources.
These case studies are exploratory and illustrative. In the case of Kansas City, however, I utilize
the results of my own survey and interviews in addition to secondary sources. The Kansas City
chapter is thus the focal point of the dissertation in that it involves original data.
10

Before examining these case studies, it is important to provide the historical, legal, and
conceptual foundations of the use of force by police. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the
controversy over excessive use of force, highlighting some of the more dramatic cases as well as
key court decisions. Chapter 3 examines the concept of legitimacy and its application to the
police-citizen relationship, focusing on the aforementioned antecedents of legitimacy. Chapter 4
contains the Los Angeles case study. The New York case study is found in Chapter 5. The indepth examination of the Kansas City experience is provided in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 offers my
conclusions and recommendations.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE IMPETUS FOR CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT

On the night of October 3, 1974, two Memphis police officers responded to a call indicating that
a residential burglary was taking place. Upon arriving at the scene, one of the officers went
around the house into the back yard, where he observed a young black male running toward a
fence. The officer ordered the young man to stop, but the order was not heeded. As 15-year-old
Edward Garner climbed the fence to make his escape, the officer shot him in the back of the
head. Garner, who was unarmed, died on the way to the hospital. The officer was acting under a
Tennessee statute that allowed police to use deadly force to prevent the escape of a fleeingfelony suspect. Accordingly, the officer involved was not prosecuted. However, a civil suit filed
by Garner’s father made its way to the United States Supreme Court. Eleven years after the
incident, the Court ruled that the officer had violated Garner’s Fourth Amendment right to be
free from an unreasonable seizure. Moreover, it held that the Tennessee statute allowing the
officer to use deadly force was unconstitutional. The Court said that deadly force can be
employed only where the officer has good reason to believe that the fleeing suspect is armed and
imminently dangerous (Tennessee v. Garner, 1985).
Historically, police officers were permitted to use as much force as necessary, including
deadly force, to make a felony arrest. The Garner decision gave rise to a flurry of litigation on
the issue of use of force by police. It also reduced the number of police shootings, and police
homicides across the country (Tennenbaum, 1994).
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In 1989, speaking through Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that an officer’s use of
force “must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene” (Graham v.
Connor, 1989, p. 490). According to Rehnquist's majority opinion, “The calculus of
reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make
split-second judgments - in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation” (Graham v. Connor, 1989, p.
490). Thus, with little practical guidance from the Supreme Court, state and federal courts
continued to grapple with cases alleging unlawful use of force by the police.
The most infamous of such cases began on March 3, 1991 when four white Los Angeles
police officers beat black motorist Rodney King, who had been stopped after a high-speed chase.
The officers claimed that King was resisting arrest and that they used reasonable force to subdue
him. When a videotape of the incident recorded by a bystander was aired on national television,
there was widespread outrage. In Los Angeles, which had long been plagued by poor relations
between the police and the minority community, tensions ran high. The officers were charged
with assault and excessive use of force, but the case was moved from downtown to suburban
Simi Valley. When an all-white jury acquitted the officers, South Central Los Angeles erupted
into riot. In 1993, the officers were prosecuted in federal court on civil rights charges. Two of
them were convicted and spent time in prison (Koon v. United States, 1996).

Ferguson, Missouri: The Michael Brown Incident
On August 9, 2014, in Ferguson, MO, Michael Brown, an unarmed, 18-year old black male, was
shot by Officer Darren Wilson, a 28-year old white male. When a St. Louis grand jury decided
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not to indict Officer Wilson, the citizens of Ferguson reacted by rioting for four nights. It was
obvious that many Ferguson residents did not believe that this shooting was legitimate.
Ferguson police responded with a strong show of force. Police “wearing camouflage,
black helmets and vests with POLICE stamped on the back … carried objects that doubled as
warnings: assault rifles, slender black nightsticks and gas masks” (Bosman & Apuzzo, 2014,
para 1). The police also employed armored vehicles, which accentuated the militaristic character
of their response. “The indiscriminate and unmodulated use of quasi-military force against
protesters … antagonized the public, escalated tension between protesters and police, and, at
times may have infringed on protesters’ constitutional rights” (The Constitution Project, 2016,
p.13). Eventually, Missouri Governor Jay Nixon ordered the state highway patrol to take over
local security.
Just days after the shooting of Michael Brown, the U.S. Justice Department announced
that it was opening its own investigation. Six months later, that investigation concluded that
there was not sufficient evidence to charge Officer Wilson with a federal civil rights offense.
Despite that conclusion, the Civil Rights Division of the DOJ investigated the Ferguson Police
Department under the pattern-or-practice provision of the Violent Crimes Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3789d, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.”
(United States Department of Justice, 2015, p. 1). This investigation declared that the
department did violate the First, Fourth and Fourteenth amendments by its pattern or practice of
unlawful conduct (United States Department of Justice, 2015). The DOJ also found that
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“Ferguson’s approach to law enforcement both reflects and reinforces racial bias,
including stereotyping” (United States Department of Justice, 2015, p. 1). The DOJ brought a
federal lawsuit against the City of Ferguson that resulted in a consent decree under which the
City pledged to make substantial changes in its law enforcement practices. Among the most
prominent of these reforms was the establishment of a civilian board to review allegations of
excessive force by the police. (United States of America v. The City of Ferguson, Consent
Decree, 2016).

Baltimore, Maryland: The Freddie Gray Case
On April 12, 2015, Freddie Gray, a 25-year-old black male, was arrested by police ostensibly for
carrying an illegal knife. Police put Gray into a police van face down with his arms handcuffed
behind his back. In transit to the police station, Gray suffered a fatal injury - his spine was 80
percent severed at his neck. District attorney Marilyn Mosby “said that Gray was illegally
arrested, assaulted and falsely accused of carrying an illegal switchblade” while the Police
Commissioner Anthony Bates “stated that it is not clear why Gray was stopped by the officers as
there ‘is no law against running’” (BBC, 2016, para 4 and 7). As the nation watched on
television, Baltimore erupted in riots on the night of Gray’s funeral.
The six officers involved in this incident were charged with various criminal charges,
ranging from second-degree assault, manslaughter by vehicle, reckless endangerment, etc. Three
of the officers were found not guilty, and charges were dropped on the other three officers due to
the not-guilty verdicts. However, in a related civil suit for damages, the City settled with Gray’s
family for $6.4 million (Hawkins, Bui, & Herman, 2016).
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As in the Ferguson, Missouri case, the U.S. Department of Justice conducted its own
investigation into the death of Freddie Gray. Just as in the Ferguson case, the DOJ concluded
that there was not sufficient evidence to charge the officers with violating Gray’s civil rights.
And just as in Ferguson, DOJ launched a patterns and practices investigation into the Baltimore
Police Department. DOJ’s 163-page report found evidence of racial profiling and the excessive
use of force. It also found that officers routinely infringe upon First Amendment freedoms,
specifically the rights to free speech and to peaceably assemble (Woolston, 2016). In August
2016, the DOJ and the City of Baltimore entered into an Agreement in Principle under which the
Baltimore Police Department would be reformed.
In January 2017 the Justice Department brought suit against the police department,
mayor, and city council of Baltimore, alleging a pattern of civil rights violations by the
police. At the same time, the parties filed a consent decree that had already been worked out
pursuant to the August Agreement in Principle. One the elements of the consent decree called
for the establishment of a Community Oversight Task Force to make recommendations to
improve community oversight of the police. “The Parties recognize that effective civilian and
community oversight of BPD is essential to rebuilding trust between BPD and the communities it
serves and ensuring that BPD’s enforcement activities reflect community values and are
consistent with the Constitution and federal, state, and local laws” (United States of America v.
Police Department of Baltimore City, Consent Decree, 2017, p. 4).
Reflecting on the task of reforming the police department, Baltimore Mayor Catherine
Pugh stated, “I’m asking the citizens to have faith that we will continue this work…we do want
to transform our police department” (Rector & Broadwater, 2017, para 2). During a 2018 federal
court hearing, the independent monitor testified that the police department was far from reaching
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compliance with any part of the consent decree (Miller, 2018). After two years, the DOJ
monitoring team stated that there were some improvements in misconduct investigations, but
they were still unsatisfactory. The team noted “inexcusable negligence over a recent instance in
which a dozen misconduct cases against officers were tossed out because the department’s
internal affairs team allowed them to expire” (Anderson, 2019, para 2). Obviously it is more
than difficult to change the inner workings of a police department.

Cleveland, Ohio: The Tamir Rice Tragedy
On November 22, 2014, Cleveland police received a call about someone brandishing a gun on
the street, but the caller noted that possibly it was child with a toy gun. Unfortunately, the
dispatcher failed to tell officers on their way to the scene exactly what the citizen said. When the
officers arrived on the scene, they saw a young African-American male sitting at a table and on
the table was what appeared to be a gun. They saw the young man retrieve the object and place
it in his waistband. While still in the car with the windows down, the officers shouted to the
young man to show his hands. When 12-year old Tamir Rice reached for the object in his
waistband, one of the officers emerged from the police car and fired two shots. One of the shots
struck Rice in the chest. He died the following day. The object of concern turned out to be a toy
gun (cleveland.com, 2017).
The officers involved in the shooting of Tamir Rice were placed on administrative leave
pending the outcome of an investigation. A year later, a local grand jury declined to indict the
officers on state criminal charges. As in Ferguson and Baltimore, the U.S. Department of Justice
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got involved. Following its investigation, DOJ issued a report that concluded “the Cleveland
Police Department and its officers had engaged in a pattern or practice of exercising excessive
force in violation of the Constitution of the United States” (United States of America v. City of
Cleveland, 2015, p. 3). A subsequent lawsuit culminated in a consent decree that was approved
by a federal district judge in June 2015 (United States of America v. City of Cleveland, 2015).
Under the consent decree, the City agreed to take steps to insure increased officer accountability
and civilian oversight.

The Newark Lawsuit
In 2011, the Justice Department began an investigation into the Newark, New Jersey Police
Department, responding to “claims that brutality, baseless searches, intimidation and false arrests
are commonplace in the Newark Police Department” (Perez-Pena, 2011, para 1). As in similar
cases, a federal lawsuit against the City led to the entry of a consent decree (United States v. City
of Newark, Consent Decree, 2016). One of the mandates in the consent decree was the creation
of the Civilian Complaint Review Board. This board has investigatory powers, including the
power to subpoena data and testimony from the police department. However in January, a
Superior Court judge in Newark “took away subpoena and investigatory powers from the city’s
Civilian Complaint Review Board” (Moriarty & Yi, 2018, para 1). The judge made this decision
based on a lawsuit filed by the Fraternal Order of Police, which claimed that the board would
undermine the police’s disciplinary process. Without those two powers, the review board had
been stripped of any ability to monitor the police department and improve police accountability.
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In June of 2019, the subpoena power was restored to the review board by the state
appellate court. However, in this court ruling, the board’s decisions are no longer binding and
they can only make recommendations to the city’s public safety director (Panico, 2019a). The
Fraternal Order of Police is continuing to challenge the Review Board, and the New Jersey
Supreme Court has agreed to hear the case (Panico, 2019b).
In an effort to document police use of force in New Jersey, “a 16-month investigation by
NJ Advance Media for NJ.com, found New Jersey’s system for tracking police force is broken,
with no statewide collection or analysis of the data, little oversight by state officials and no
standard practices among local departments” (Stirling & Sullivan, para 7). The Report found
that blacks were more than three times more likely to experience excessive use of force and that
the department’s system for reporting use of force was dysfunctional. There is also a trend that
New Jersey does not monitor officers using disproportionately higher amounts of force (Stirling
and Sullivan, 2018).
The independent monitor for the consent decree against the Newark Police Department
(NPD) has a webpage dedicated to information and reports on the activities of the monitor. The
consent decree was signed in March of 2016 and stated that Newark and the NPD were to
revamp and improve the quality of policing by increasing community oversight and
developing new policies and procedures for officer misconduct as well as using in-car and
body-worn cameras (NOD Independent Monitor, 2019, p. 1).

Seattle Shooting and Response
In 2012 the Department of Justice investigated an incident in which John T. Williams, a Native
American woodcarver, was shot and killed by a Seattle police officer (Kroman, 2018). The
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shooting took place after police observed Williams crossing the street with what appeared to be a
knife in his hand. An officer yelled three times to “Put the knife down.” Within seconds the
officer fired five rounds, striking Williams with four. The Firearms Review Board determined
that the shooting was unjustified and recommended that the officer be fired. The officer chose to
resign, and no criminal charges were filed against him (Kirshner, 2013). As in the other cities
discussed previously, the Department of Justice launched its own investigation, which found a
“pattern or practice of excessive force that violates the U. S. Constitution and federal law”
(Seattle Police Monitor, 2018, para 2). And, as in other cities, the federal government filed suit
(United States of America v. City of Seattle, 2012). The settlement called for the City to revise
its use-of-force policy, the appointment of an independent monitor and establishing a new
civilian oversight board.
In October 2012, Seattle adopted an ordinance creating the Community Police
Commission. The purpose of this ordinance is to ensure that Seattle’s police department
operates in accordance with the Constitution with the goal of increasing public confidence in the
police (DOJ Community Police Commission, 2012). A 2017 ordinance made the CPC
permanent and expanded its size and authority. In 2018, the federal court that was monitoring
compliance with the settlement agreement found that that City was in “full and effective
compliance” (Miletich & Carter, 2018, para 1). After an officer punched a handcuffed woman,
the police chief fired him but unfortunately an arbitrator reinstated him (Miletich & Carter,
2019). In light of this incident, District Court Judge James Robart ordered the police department
and city officials to defend the decision to reinstate the officer. After a hearing, the judge “found
the appeals process threatened public confidence in reform efforts, ruled the department had
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fallen out of compliance in that one narrow area, and ordered SPD to fix it” (Miletich & Carter,
2019, para 15).

Chicago, Illinois: The Laquan McDonald Case
Chicago has a long history of conflict between the police and the citizenry, especially the black
community. That conflict spiked in October 2016 when a police officer shot and killed 17-yearold Laquan McDonald. After a truck driver reported someone breaking into vehicles, officers
pursued McDonald, who refused to stop. McDonald had a three-inch pocketknife in his
hand. Officer Jason Van Dyke, arriving on the scene in his squad car, stepped out and
shot McDonald sixteen times. Van Dyke was convicted of second-degree murder and
aggravated battery and sentenced to seven years in prison (Smith, Williams, & Davey, 2018).
Three other officers who were also at the scene were acquitted of falsifying reports and
conspiring to cover up the shooting. For Prosecutor Holmes, there is hope that the code of
silence will eventually become non-existent (Ailworth, 2019).
Subsequently, the nine-member Chicago Police Board “fired a sergeant and three officers
… for exaggerating the threat posed by the 17-year old McDonald in order to justify the actions
of Officer Jason Van Dyke…” (Gorner, 2019, para 3). The Inspector General recommended
firing eleven officers, but six of them resigned before being dismissed. Two of those six
included a deputy chief and chief of detectives. Not surprisingly, the Fraternal Order of Police
disagreed with the decision, claiming that the officers did nothing wrong. McDonald was killed
in 2014, and five years later, the officers were finally held accountable.
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In the years since the McDonald shooting, Chicago has been struggling with the issue of
police reform. On January 31, 2019, U.S. District Judge Robert Dow approved the consent
decree which would now govern reform of the police department (Seidel, 2019). Judge Dow
also noted that “…the 2.85 million annual price tag of a yet-to-be-chosen monitoring team is
dwarfed by the legal cost Chicago has suffered in the last 15 years” (Seidel, 2019, para 7).

Baton Rouge, Louisiana: The Alton Sterling Incident
In 2016 Alton Sterling, a 37-year-old black male, was shot and killed by a Baton Rouge police
officer outside a convenience store. Two officers had responded to a call indicating that
someone was carrying a firearm. When Sterling questioned why the officers had confronted
him, the officers wrestled Sterling to the ground. Officer Salamoni saw that Sterling was armed,
yelled out, “He’s got a gun,” and immediately shot and killed Sterling (Chavez, 2018). This
shooting was the first police incident in which the Attorney General was Jeff Sessions, and the
Department of Justice decided that no charges would be brought against the officers (Kaleem &
Tanfani, 2018). Two years after the shooting, Salamoni was fired and the police department
released Salamoni’s body-camera footage.
In an effort to thwart continuing incidents similar to this, the Louisiana legislature passed
HB473, which became effective on June 16, 2017 (LegiScan.com). Under this legislation, police
officers may have their certification revoked for a number of reasons, including malfeasance
while conducting their duties. Since this legislation passed, the Peace Officer Standards and
Training Council (POST) has permanently decertified only 26 officers. Unfortunately according
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to Ursula Price, executive director of the New Orleans Workers’ Center for Racial Justice,
“Nobody’s playing their roles; they all support and cover for each other. The DA is not a check
on police power. Judges are not checks on DA power. They’re all part of one community” (Fan
et al., p. 3). A loophole in this legislation allows POST not to decertify officers in the absence of
a criminal conviction.

Excessive Force and Police Bias
In all of the aforementioned cases, white police officers used deadly force against minority
citizens. The excessive use of force by police, especially as it involves minorities, has been a
serious issue in the United States for decades. In a statistical study based on the National Justice
Database, the Center for Policing Equity (CPE) found that, “although police officers employ
force in less than 2% of all police-civilian interactions, the use of force is more than three times
higher for African Americans than for whites…” (Chauhan, Goff, Hermann, & Piza, 2018, p.
21).
The problem tends to spike at times and then recede. In the first six months of 2017,
police killed 492 people nationwide, which was roughly the number of all police killings in
2016. As in earlier years, African-American males were disproportionately killed by police
(Sullivan, Thebault, & Jenkins, 2017). The Bureau of Justice Statistics produced nationwide
data showing that for 2015, the percentage of whites contacted by police who were shot was 2.4
percent. However, for blacks and Hispanics, the percentage of persons shot was roughly 5
percent (Davis, Whyde, & Langton, 2018).
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A study of San Diego police officers and the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department
found that officers were more likely to use force against blacks than whites (Winkley &
Schroeder, 2019). Between 2016 and 2018, “the San Diego police department stopped black
people at a 219 percent higher rate per population than white people” and “[t]he San Diego
Sheriff’s deputies stopped black people at 130 percent higher rate per population than white
people” (Sinyangwe, 2019, p. 1). Once stopped by either agency, “black people were more
likely to be searched, arrested and to have force used against them” (Sinyangwe, 2019, p. 1).
In another study, the Urban Institute and the Center for Policing Equity examined racial
disparities in the Austin, Texas Police Department. In areas where there are distinctly more
Hispanic and black residents, the research showed that these residents experienced an inordinate
amount of police force (Goff, Obermark, LaVigne, Yahner, & Geller, 2017). In reviewing the
literature on the excessive use of force by police, there is more research that identifies minorities
as the ones who will face more victimization than whites (Smith & Holmes, 2014). One reason
that African Americans are more likely to be the targets of excessive police force is that “police
are more likely to come into contact with young black males than with other demographics”
(Strother, Menifield, & Shin, 2018, para 8). After extensive research, they found that blacks
make up a small percentage of the nation; however, they have a disproportionately larger chance
of being killed versus whites.
Not all researchers are convinced that police are racially biased in their use of force. One
recent study found no evidence for anti-Black or anti-Hispanic bias in police shootings, stressing
that “White officers are not more likely to shoot minority civilians than non-White officers”
(Johnson, Tress, Burkel, Taylor, & Cesario, 2019, p. 15877). That study has drawn sharp
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criticism, however. Princeton political scientist Dean Knox argues that “It’s just a completely
indefensible conclusion to draw from the data that’s available” (Bawagan, 2019, para. 2). Phillip
Atiba Goff of the John Jay College of Criminal Justice has criticized the Johnson et al. study for
not considering the possibility that all police—irrespective of race—could be biased in shooting
black people (Bawagan, 2019, para. 3).
One of the recommendations from this study is that the San Diego County Citizens’ Law
Enforcement Review Board should be given the power to impose discipline and recommend
changes to police policies. Without these changes, the board cannot effectuate any change
toward accountability. As noted in 2018, most of the board’s recommendations were ignored by
the police department. Out of the 226 complaints in 2016 and 2017, merely 11% favored
civilians. ”Moreover, complaints alleging the most serious misconduct were never [emphasis
added] sustained (Sinyangwe, 2019, p. 19).
In our society, there is a widespread perception that young black males are more likely to
engage in criminal activity or threatening behavior. There is reason to believe that police
officers, regardless of their race, share that perception (Bayley, Davis, & Davis, 2015).
Although use of force is legally justifiable if the officer perceives a threat, either to his or her life
or the community, there is evidence that race will affect the perceptions of threat (Spencer,
Kharbonneau, & Glaser, 2016).
As in the Rodney King case, the use of force by police often occurs at the end of a highspeed motor vehicle chase. A study conducted by USA TODAY showed that, when there are
police chases, African Americans are more than three times likely than others to be killed by
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police (Frank, 2016). It may well be that, given their fear and suspicion of the police, African
Americans would rather attempt to flee than be arrested on a minor charge. Of course, an
attempt to flee often gives rise to the use of force by police. The USA Today study showed,
“Deadly pursuits of black drivers were twice as likely to start over minor offenses or non-violent
crimes…nearly every deadly pursuit that was triggered by an illegally tinted window, a seat-belt
violation or the smell of marijuana involved a black driver” (Frank, 2016, para 10).
The issue of excessive force is closely tied to the issue of racially-biased policing.
However, there are many types of police/citizen encounters that can manifest racial bias,
including pedestrian stops, which often entail the so-called stop and frisk, as well as reasonable
traffic stops in which drivers may or may not consent to a vehicle search. There is substantial
evidence showing that African Americans are more likely to experience difficulties in their
encounters with the police (Browning, et al., 1994; Flanagan & Vaughn, 1996; Harris, 1997).
Impoverished neighborhoods are more likely to have more aggressive policing because
police are addressing crime and disorder. Unfortunately this type of policing leads to the
residents feeling estranged and mistrustful of police. “As the police attempt to halt crime and
disorder, the social processes of that area can assist police in gaining or losing trust, however,
these processes are much greater that the activities of police” (Bradford, Jackson & Hough,
2017, p. 631).
After many studies regarding police-public encounters, “the relationship between how
people recall being treated and their general confidence in the police may be asymmetrical”
(Skogan, 2006, p. 99). When analyzing police-citizen contacts, there is strong asymmetry in
citizen-initiated contacts but lower for police-initiated contacts (Skogan, 2006, p. 118).
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Racial Discrepancies in Attitudes toward the Police
Attitudes toward the police are shaped not only by direct encounters but by word of mouth
within communities and, of course, media coverage. However, personal experiences with police
have more effect on shaping people’s opinion of police than the media. “Consumption of crimerelated media increased confidence in the police among white respondents but had no effect on
Latinos and African Americans” (Callahan & Rosenberger, 2011, p. 167). When comparing
television with newspaper coverage of police, television has a more positive effect on citizens
while newspapers are more inclined to cover police use of force and corruption. Contact with
police is a key determinant of how individuals perceive police; however, absent those contacts,
media coverage influences public opinion. Although whites’ attitudes towards police does not
change when viewing a brutal arrest of a black youth, black attitudes are notably lower among
blacks and remain this way longer than whites (Callahan & Rosenberger, 2011).
Whatever the source of attitudes, it is clear that African Americans and Hispanics harbor
more negative attitudes about the police (Campbell & Schuman, 1968; Decker, 1981; Howell,
Perry, & Vile, 2004; Smith, Graham & Adams, 1991; Weitzer & Tuch, 2005). A study by the
Bureau of Justice Statistics found that African Americans in major metropolitan areas were twice
as likely as whites to be displeased with law enforcement (Greenfield, Langan and Smith, 1997).
These negative attitudes shape future encounters with police and possibly create a descending
spiral in the relationship between the police and minority communities.
Over the years, surveys have analyzed how blacks and whites perceive law enforcement.
A 2016 Pew survey questioned whether blacks are treated the same as whites. The survey found
that 67 percent of blacks and 40 percent of whites believe that blacks are not treated fairly by
police. In the same year Gallup conducted its annual survey on citizens’ confidence in police
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and 58 percent of whites and 29 percent of blacks showed either a lot or great deal of confidence
in police (Kimbrough, 2017).
In the next chapter, I will examine how the perception of police bias and the typical
institutional response to allegations of police misconduct negatively affect key determinants of
police legitimacy. I will also consider how the creation of civilian oversight mechanisms might
mitigate these effects.
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CHAPTER TWO
CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT AND POLICE LEGITIMACY

Legitimacy is a key concept in the social sciences and, in particular, political science. In
Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Max Weber identified three sources
of legitimacy:
“traditional authority, based on the sanctity of customs and traditions; charismatic
authority, which finds justification in the exceptional qualities of the power holder; and
the legal-rational authority, which is grounded in a belief in the legality of the enacted
rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands”
(Tankebe, 2013, p. 107).

While all three sources of legitimacy can be found in any society, modern democratic
societies stress the legal-rational authority, which is closely related to the notion of the rule of
law. This is especially true in the United States and other countries that take seriously the idea of
constitutionalism.
As to the legitimacy of law enforcement, there is good reason to believe that it depends
on public perceptions of how the police exercise their authority (Tyler, 2004).
In a democratic society, it is critically important that the public regards law enforcement as
legitimate (National Institute of Justice, 2013). The notion that policing is based on, and limited
by, legal rules is key to the legitimacy of law enforcement agencies in a democratic society.
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As noted in the previous chapter, it is important to recognize that “citizens make
judgments – every day – about the rightfulness or wrongfulness of police conduct, whether or not
they experienced it directly…” (Buchner, 2014, p. 2). Certainly, high-profile incidents of police
using deadly force can lead citizens to make such judgments.
Public evaluations of police legitimacy impact people’s compliance with the law as well
as their willingness to cooperate with the police. In two New York surveys it was found that
legitimacy has a strong influence on the public’s reactions to the police (Sunshine, 2003).
Legitimacy can be tied to people’s social values and not necessarily related to police
performance. If people view the police as legitimate, then it is likely that their behavior will
conform to the law, thus allowing the police additional time to deal with more serious issues.
The perception of legitimacy also leads to the public cooperating with the police in reducing
crime as well as public support for police using their discretionary authority to resolve
problematic situations.
Figure 2.1 below shows a theoretical model of legitimacy that can be applied to law
enforcement. In this model, which is gleaned from the literature, legitimacy is primarily a
function of trust. Trust, in turn, is affected by accountability (i.e., whether officers who engage
in misconduct are adequately disciplined), descriptive representation, as well as procedural
justice. The idea that the procedures established to discipline police officers are seen as
fundamentally fair, irrespective of their outcome. Of course, for people to form this perception,
there must be a reasonable level of transparency, so that people know what is going on.
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Figure 2.1: A Model of Legitimacy

Trust
It is common knowledge that there has been a decline of public trust in a variety of public
institutions. Because trust “is an essential elixir for public life and neighborly relations,”
(Rainie, Keeter, & Perrin, 2019), the decline of public trust in American institutions is a
worrisome development. In the case of law enforcement, the decline in public trust is
particularly noticeable, especially among minority communities. Today, while age and income
are positively associated with trust in law enforcement, race is the strongest statistical predictor
of trust, or lack thereof, in the police (Rotenberg, 2018).
In my theoretical model, trust is key to legitimacy. Trust, in turn, is a function of
accountability, descriptive representation, and perceptions of procedural justice. There are two
kinds of trust: institutional trust and motive-based trust. As it relates to law enforcement,
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institutional trust occurs when citizens believe that police are honest and competent as well as
handle their responsibilities for all citizens. Whereas, motive-based trust develops when citizens
perceive the intentions of the police to be centered on the concerns of citizens. Both forms of
trust are tied to the public’s opinion of law enforcement’s procedural fairness (Tyler, 2005). A
police officer will be legitimate because he has a role to play within the institution, the police
department. Therefore, a police officer will be trusted when he performs according to his role
(Hawdon, 2008).
Social capital is organized by concepts of norms and trust with an organization whereby
cooperation is facilitated for the benefit of all within that social organization. Furthermore, there
is a difference between bridging capital and bonding capital. “Bonding capital holds people
together in groups while bridging capital connects people across diverse groups” (Hawdon, 2008,
p. 189). People in bonding groups tend to trust those within the group and will not trust those
outside the group. The bridging group tends to connect with the larger social order and will
probably treat law enforcement as legitimate, whereas, members of the bonding group tend to
distrust those outside their group (Hawdon, 2008).
Generally, there are three types of policing: service (emphasis on community, watchman
(order maintenance) and legalistic (focus on law enforcement). Someone with high bonding and
bridging capital will trust an officer; high bridging, low bonding – respect the role of the officers;
low bridging, low bonding – most difficult for police because (a) their low perception of the
institution of the police and (b) the people in this group trust those within their environment and
not those outside (Hawdon, 2008).
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When there is a disturbance or killing in a minority neighborhood (low bridging, low
bonding), it seems logical that the officer will have a difficult time gathering information from
the residents. Even if an officer attempts to be service-oriented, the residents will not trust him.
At some point an officer will display each of these policing styles, and hopefully identifies the
one style to which a particular neighborhood responds.

Accountability
Accountability empowers citizens and/or their elected representatives to ensure that public
officials are answerable for their actions. “Accountability controls and legitimizes government
action by linking them to the ‘democratic chain of delegation’” (Bovens, Schillemans, & Hart,
2008, p. 229). Accountability has been, and always will be, an integral element of the
relationship between government and the public it serves. “How well any government functions
hinges on how good citizens are at making their politicians accountable for their actions”
(Adserà, Boix, & Payne, 2003, p. 478).
Democracies hold governmental institutions accountable through various control
measures – checks and balances (Mulgan, 2000). Citizens in a democratic society rightly expect
a certain level of performance from their governing institutions. Most citizens understand the
need for government officials to exercise authority and a certain degree of discretion. However,
the public must demand accountability from public officials because the officials have been
given a lot of discretion in making decisions about the city’s activities (Kelly, 2005).
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Professionalism implies an internal level of accountability; a professional has the
knowledge and training to do the right thing. Even though professionals have a lot of discretion,
they are still accountable to both administrative and political superiors (Mulgan, 2000). An
example of these professionals is police officers who have expertise and extensive training in
executing law enforcement functions. But there have been many examples in which officers
have not acted professionally nor been held accountable.
Because street-level bureaucrats like police have a certain amount of discretion in how
they apply established rules to various situations, accountability can become blurred. “At the
same time these actors work under an action imperative: they have to act. Actors see themselves
forced to make choices: choices about how to deal with a specific rule – in general and in
specific situations – but also choices between rules” (Hupe & Hill, 2007, p. 281). Since streetlevel bureaucrats are working for the public, they can be held accountable for their results. In the
typical top-down organization, the people below the top are accountable to those at the top;
therefore, accountability becomes an obligation for those at the bottom to justify their conduct
(Hupe & Hill, 2007).
In the law enforcement context, police are accountable to their superiors within the police
department, but the process of holding officers accountable commences with an Internal Affairs
investigation. These investigations, which are cloaked in secrecy, may or may not be impartial
and effective at determining the veracity of a complaint. In so many high-profile incidents in
which the police have used questionable force, and where Internal Affairs investigations have
exonerated the officers involved, it is quite understandable that the public may have doubts about
the efficacy of this accountability mechanism. This is especially true when white police officers
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are exonerated after using deadly force against minority citizens. In such situations, it is highly
likely that the minority community will not accept the internal investigation as legitimate.
Civilian oversight of law enforcement is designed to enhance the accountability of the
police. With the rise of oversight agencies, law enforcement becomes directly accountable to
citizens in a more public forum. By effectively utilizing oversight agencies, citizens can
participate in the effectiveness of police governance. “Governance is effective to the extent that
governance arrangements are capable of solving the substantive problems that they are set to
address” (Fung, 2015, p. 517).
NACOLE, a national organization dedicated to promoting civilian oversight of law
enforcement, has identified a number of benefits that it believes will flow from the creation of
civilian oversight structures. Fundamentally, oversight is seen as a means of improving the
accountability of the police, in that the purpose of such a board is to provide an independent
adjudication of complaints of police misconduct. Moreover, the very creation of an oversight
board is thought to improve the public’s perception of the city’s commitment to the principle of
accountability (National Association of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement, (NACOLE,
n.d.).
Private citizens who serve on civilian oversight boards are typically appointed by an
outside entity, for example, the city council. They are not supposed to hold any allegiance to the
police establishment, nor are they supposed to assume an adversarial posture. Their role is to
make an impartial determination as to whether officers have used excessive (unlawful) force.
Their duty is “to pursue the public good according to their own criteria of what was right”
(Mulgan, 2000, p. 561).
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To achieve complete accountability as it relates to the use of force and other critical
activities, police departments will have to conduct significant reorganizations (Walker, 2019, p.
xvii). However, significant departmental changes have not been focused on since it is typically
the officer who garners the public attention and therefore has emotional appeal to engage the
public and media attention. Departmental changes do not have any emotional appeal (Walker,
2019). There have been several lawsuits against police departments and the cities, for example,
“in 2016 Chicago paid $52 million in lawsuits and outside attorneys” (Walker, 2019, p. 47).
Departments have spent millions of dollars on officer misconduct, yet they are still hesitant to
effect significant change. A deterrent for police accountability is the police subculture wherein
officers have unwritten norms which include how to stay out of trouble and how much they can
get away with (Walker, 2019).
There still exist various roadblocks to accountability. Departmental leadership itself
could be a hindrance when a new chief is hired, and accountability is not one of his priorities.
Since police departments are among many departments in a city, funding may not be sufficient to
advance accountability measures or an accountability-focused chief may be fired (Walker, 2019,
p. 302).

Descriptive Representation
Decades ago, Pitkin (1967) argued that descriptive representation of minorities in positions of
authority can enhance perceptions of legitimacy. Since then, there has been considerable
research pointing out the benefits of representative bureaucracy. It is well established that
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“perceptions about bureaucratic legitimacy can be positively affected when the identity of the
bureaucrat matches that of the client” (Riccucci, Van Ryzin, & Lavena, 2014, p. 537).
Applying this notion to the police, Theobald and Haider-Markel (2009) found evidence
that black citizens were more likely to perceive their encounters with police as legitimate if there
were black officers present during the encounter. There is now a widespread sense that
improving the descriptive representativeness of police forces can improve relations between law
enforcement and minority communities.
In the 1980s police departments (often as the result of a consent decree) attempted to hire
more minority officers, and some progress was made along these lines (Lewis 1989). In 1987,
about 9% of local police officers were black; as of 2013 that figure had risen to just over 12%
(Reaves, 2015). Yet, it remains the case that in most encounters between police officers and
minority citizens, the officers are white.
There are a number of barriers to the recruitment of minority officers, not the least of
which is the negative relationship that often exists between police departments and the minority
communities they serve. In constructing civilian oversight boards, best practices dictate that
local officials should strive to appoint board members who represent the diversity of their
communities (Finn, 2001). Presumably, a more diverse board is more likely to engender trust
across the community.

Procedural Justice
Procedural justice refers to fairness in the administration of justice. Procedural justice entails
“…neutrality, lack of bias, honesty, efforts to be fair, politeness, and respect for citizens’ rights”
(Tyler & Wakslak, 2004, p. 279). In law enforcement, that equates to the impartial exercise of
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police discretion as well as treating citizens with dignity and respect (Tyler, 1994). Along these
lines, it has been noted that “issues of respect figure prominently in conceptions of fairness and
equal treatment across all racial and ethnic groups, as well as in people’s conceptions of justice”
(Stone, Foglesong, & Cole, 2009, p. 50).
It has been argued that “…fairness and respectful treatment (i.e., procedural justice) are
the primary antecedents of police legitimacy” (Antrobus et al., 2015, p. 153). One study found
that procedural justice was the most important factor in determining levels of trust in the police
and that a positive evaluation of procedural justice could reverse the influence of unfavorable
neighborhood and social environments (Nix, Wolfe, Rojek, & Kaminski, 2015). On the other
hand, Worden and McLean (2016) found that the citizens’ positive judgments about procedural
justice had only modest effects on trust in the police. However, negative perceptions of
procedural justice had substantial negative effects. In other words, citizens expect procedural
justice and when it exists, current levels of trust can be maintained. But when citizens perceive
procedural injustice, the negative effect on trust can be profound.
The basic concept of community policing, which became popular in the 1990s, is that
effective policing requires public support and cooperation. The public is much more likely to
cooperate with the police when they have a favorable opinion that the police will act with
fairness and impartiality. “A focus on building legitimacy via procedural justice is surely not the
whole of effective policing, but it is an important component…” (Tyler, Goff, & MacCoun,
2015, p. 77).
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Enhancing police departments’ commitment to procedural justice may well have a
positive effect on community trust in the police. To do this requires a commitment from the top
down—from mayors and police commissioners down to the cops on the street. It requires a
different approach to recruitment and training and is not easily implemented. In addition to
practical problems, such a dramatic change in philosophy is apt to run into a “cultural wall”
(Worden & McLean, 2016, p. 152)
The Chicago Police Department conducted an experimental training program based on
the idea of procedural justice from mid-2012 to September 2013. The “training increased officer
support for all of the procedural justice dimensions included in the experiment” (Skogan, Van
Craen, & Hennessy, 2015, p. 319). After receiving the training, “officers were more likely to
endorse the importance of giving citizens a voice, granting them dignity and respect,
demonstrating neutrality, and (with the least enthusiasm) trusting them to do the right thing”
(Skogan et al., 2015, p. 319). Skogan et al. concluded that such training can play a role in
improving police relations with the communities they serve.
Public perceptions of procedural fairness in law enforcement depend primarily on the
behavior of the police themselves. These perceptions also depend on how police agencies handle
claims of police misconduct. When citizens file complaints against police officers and the police
department’s internal affairs department rules in favor of the officer consistently, citizens will
question the motivations of the police. The lack of transparency in internal affairs investigations
contributes to a climate of suspicion.
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Transparency
In its broadest sense, transparency means that there is a free flow of information within a
political system. In a democratic system, transparency is essential if the perception of procedural
fairness is to be maintained. As Ian Shapiro (2003, p. 200) has noted, “democratic leaders can
never be entirely free from a commitment to truth-telling.” Transparency is also crucial to ensure
the accountability of government (Hollyer, Rosendorff, & Vreeland, 2014).
In 2013, as a first step in collecting data for this dissertation, I conducted a survey of
more than 200 police and oversight practitioners who attended the NACOLE annual conference
in Salt Lake City. The focus of the survey was transparency—its definition and the indicators
that it has been achieved. The consensus of respondents was that transparency includes openness
of records and procedures, especially in the complaint process, as well as regular reporting on
police activities.
Requiring police officers to wear body cameras to record encounters with citizens is an
important step toward greater transparency with respect to police-citizen encounters. To
promote transparency, the Austin Texas Police Department has instituted a policy “that someone
may be terminated immediately if his or her camera is not activated during a deadly-force
incident (without appropriate justification) …” (Goff et al., 2016, p. 15). Not only can body
camera videos provide crucial evidence to Internal Affairs and/or civilian oversight agencies
investigating allegations of police misconduct, the public release of these videos can diminish (or
exacerbate, depending on content) public concern about police misconduct.
Each police department maintains its own statistics and records; there is no national
database to analyze patterns across the United States. However, the Department of Justice has
created the National Justice Database to compile national-level statistics about police behavior.
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Police departments serving 25% of the U.S. population have committed to sharing their data,
approximately 100 departments. Following President Obama’s Task Force on 21 st Century
Policing, the Police Data Initiative was launched to make data publicly available. The Police
Foundation “makes this data available through a portal on its website…through such
transparency the Police Data Initiative aims to rebuild trust between communities and police”
(Goff et al., 2016, p. 2).
As the 21st century continues to evolve toward greater openness with various forms of
social media, law enforcement and oversight agencies both have an opportunity to communicate
with the public in a direct and more open fashion. However, merely using social media to
communicate with citizens is not enough to improve the perception of transparency.
“Governments that only use social media to deliver messages to citizens and never ask for
feedback or react to comments or posts from citizens limit their ability to communicate”
(Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2015, p. 599). By utilizing Twitter as a means to communicate
with citizens, the police are attempting to appear that they are modernistic. However, the use of
Twitter does not improve the perception of procedural justice or fairness. Since Twitter is not
typically used by communities to reach police, other social media outlets may be more effective
in presenting the police in a positive light (Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2015).

Police Resistance to Reform
Law enforcement agencies, while necessary to any civilized society, do not harmonize well with
a democratic polity. Their hierarchical structures and militaristic styles often provoke feelings of
fear and mistrust on the part of citizens. The occupation of police officer tends to attract
authoritarian personalities. Moreover, police organizations are not known for transparency, and
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police unions often resist efforts to improve transparency and accountability. Without question,
reforming the police is a daunting challenge.
Although officers are in a hierarchical organization, they do their jobs with very little
supervision. Procedural justice, as has been noted, is a critical element of how citizens perceive
the police. But that is only the beginning. Procedural justice applies to officers themselves.
“…encouraging procedurally just behavior within departments has been proposed as a way to
change officer behavior outside of it” (Trinker, Tyler, & Goff, 2016, p. 158). Over the years, it
has been noted that police departments’ command and control structure is a hindrance to the
improvement of long-term strategies to fight crime (Trinker, Tyler, & Goff, 2016). “In short, a
democratic approach to policing can be summarized as a style of fair, participatory communitybased policing that uses force and coercion as a last resort (Trinker, Tyler, & Goff, 2016, p.160).
How officers are treated within their departments is a critical aspect of democratic
policing. If officers are treated fairly by the department, then they are more likely to “endorse a
community model of policing incorporating procedurally just tactics and reject excessive use of
force to the extent that they believed their organization treated them fairly” (Trinker, Tyler, &
Goff, 2006, p. 167). It has been suggested that officer misconduct can be related back to the
department, and organizational theory implies that employee deviance is a result of unjust and
unfair actions by the department. Wolfe & Piquero noted some actions that departments could
implement in order to reduce officer misconduct: promotions and special assignments should be
fairly distributed; disciplinary measures and the process should be fair and actions explained; and
down-the-line officers need to understand that the department values their opinions and cares for
their well-being (Wolfe & Piquero, 2011, p. 333).
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As noted earlier, procedural justice is a critical element in determining whether citizens
will trust the police to “do the right thing.” Procedural justice also applies to police officers who
may or may not perceive their department as fair and just. If an officer believes the department
is not fair and just, then it is more likely that the officer will not always adhere to policies and
regulations. When an officer considers the department as legitimate and procedurally fair, the
officer tends to exhibit those fair actions to the people they interact with (Tyler, Callahan &
Frost, 2007, p. 482).

Civilian Oversight and the Elements of Legitimacy
There are many types of reforms that can have a positive impact on the legitimacy of the police.
Most reformers consider civilian oversight to be a key element in the movement to reform law
enforcement. It is hoped, and is certainly plausible, that civilian oversight can improve
transparency, procedural justice, accountability, and descriptive representation, which in turn
should improve trust in law enforcement. It remains to be seen whether civilian oversight
agencies are having these desired effects.
To answer that question, I conducted research on three police departments: New York
City Police Department (NYPD), Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and Kansas City
Police Department (KCPD). NYPD and LAPD have long histories of police misconduct, and
various attempts have been made to reduce misconduct, including Justice Department Consent
Decrees. For these two cities, I conducted in-depth analyses using secondary sources. For
KCPD, I used Qualtrics surveys of police, city council members, members of the Board of Police
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Commissioners, OCC staff and complainants. All of the responses were anonymous with an
option to include comments, and the option to be personally interviewed by me. Additionally, I
organized both in-person and telephonic interviews of the people who gave me phone numbers
with written consent to interview them.
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CHAPTER THREE
CASE STUDY: LOS ANGELES

Los Angeles has had a long history of racial tension and, in particular, conflict between its police
and its minority communities. This long-standing conflict flared up in April 1992 when an allwhite jury acquitted four white LAPD officers of criminal charges stemming from the nationallytelevised beating of motorist Rodney King. The video “was one of the first police brutality
videos of its kind, and forever changed the conversation about police and race in America” (CBS
Evening News, 2016, para. 2).

The Board of Police Commissioners
Article 9, Section 5(b) of the City of Los Angeles’ City Charter sets forth the management
structure of LAPD. It also establishes a Board of Police Commissioners who have the power to
supervise and regulate the police department. The mayor appoints five commissioners to the
Board who are then confirmed by the City Council, and each board member serves a maximum
of two five-year terms. One of the Board’s responsibilities is to nominate candidates for the
position of Chief of Police. The City’s personnel department recommends six candidates to the
Board which, in turn, nominates three candidates for consideration by the mayor. The mayor’s
appointee is subject to confirmation by the LA City Council. The Board also has authority to
remove the police chief, but this action is subject to veto by the mayor within a five-day period.
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The Christopher Commission
In April 1991, in the immediate aftermath of the Rodney King incident, Los Angeles Mayor Tom
Bradley created the independent Christopher Commission to investigate LAPD’s recruitment and
training practices, its internal disciplinary system, and its system for handling citizen complaints.
Later that year, the Commission issued its report. The Commission found that many LAPD
officers routinely ignored departmental policy and used excessive force against citizens. It also
found that the City’s Board of Police Commissioners failed to monitor and correct these abuses.
The Commission concluded that such abuses “will not diminish until ranking officers know they
will be held responsible for what happens in their sector, whether or not they personally
participate" (Human Rights Watch, 2018, p. 1).
One of the Christopher Commission’s recommendations was for the creation of an
Inspector General (IG) who would report to the Board of Police Commissioners and would be
responsible for overseeing the Police Department’s handling of complaints against officers as
well as all officer-involved shootings (Los Angeles Police Department, 2018b). In 1995, LA
voters approved an amendment to the City Charter creating the Office of Inspector General.
“The original duty of the OIG was to inspect, on behalf of the Police Commission, LAPD’s
handling of complaints of employee misconduct, and to perform other duties as assigned by the
Commission” (Office of the Inspector General, 1995, para 1).

The Rampart Scandal and its Aftermath
In 1997, Deputy Chief Bernard C. Parks became the 52nd Chief of the LAPD. Under Chief
Parks, there was more emphasis on accountability and professionalism as he moved toward a
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goal of community policing. However, in 1999 LAPD was rocked by a scandal involving the
CRASH (Community Resources against Street Hoodlums) unit of its Rampart Division. The
scandal involved officers stealing confiscated drugs, framing suspects, and committing acts of
brutality. One the officers arrested in the scandal, Rafael Perez, became a witness for the
prosecution and “provided more than 4,000 pages in sworn testimony. Before he was done,
Perez implicated about 70 officers in misconduct, from bad shootings to drinking beer on the
job” (PBS Frontline, 2018, para 13).
In response to this scandal, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a civil lawsuit
based on Title 42, §14141(a) alleging that LAPD continues to make false arrests as well as the
continuance of practicing excessive force (Los Angeles Police Department, 2018a). In settling
this lawsuit, the City of Los Angeles entered into a consent decree that would last a minimum of
five years (United States v. City of Los Angeles, Consent Decree, 2001). There were nine major
areas emphasized by the consent decree which included management bolstering measures to
promote civil rights integrity and community outreach (Los Angeles Police Department, 2018a,
n.d.). Pursuant to the consent decree, the federal district court appointed a monitor to work with
the IG in reforming LAPD.
In the wake of the Rampart scandal, a blue-ribbon panel appointed by the Police
Commission issued a series of reports. In its first report, the panel harshly criticized the culture
and methods of LAPD, noted the poor relationship between LAPD and the community, and
faulted the City for weak civilian oversight of the police department. The report called for an
expansion of the resources of the Inspector General’s office (Rampart Independent Review
Panel, 2000).
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Beginning in 2000, the OIG’s new powers included “the authority to initiate any audit or
investigation of LAPD without prior approval by the Police Commission, guaranteed access to
all department information and documents, and the power to subpoena a witness at will” (Los
Angeles Police Commission, 2016, p.19).
Six years after the Rampart scandal was uncovered, a follow-up report by the same panel
noted that the Rampart division had recovered from the scandal by adopting a crime-fighting
model that stressed collaboration with the community. Still, the panel found that the relationship
between LAPD and the community was highly antagonistic and that officers still harbored an ‘us
versus them’ mentality. It also found that supervisors were delinquent in punishing scandalous
behavior and that whistleblowers faced retaliation (Rampart Independent Review Panel, 2006).
The report concluded that the Inspector General alone was in a position to effectively
recommend changes to enable LAPD to be an accountable agency. Unfortunately, when this
report was written, the Inspector General’s office was not functioning as a check on the
department due to resource constraints. Therefore, the report recommended that additional
resources be allocated to the IG office (Rampart Independent Review Panel, 2006).
In 2009 the Harvard Kennedy School’s Program in Criminal Justice Policy and
Management issued a report entitled: Policing Los Angeles under a Consent Decree: The
Dynamics of Change at the LAPD. Among its many findings, the report noted that:
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 “Public satisfaction is up, with 83% of residents saying the LAPD is doing a good or
excellent job.”
 “The frequency of the use of serious force has fallen each year since 2004.”
 “Management and the governance of the LAPD have both changed for the better under
the decree.”
 “… black residents of Los Angeles are among the most hopeful about the Department.”
(Stone, Foglesong, & Cole, 2009, pp. i,ii).

Even though the report characterized black residents as hopeful, there was a 2005-2009
survey that noted 10% of black respondents “reported that almost no LAPD officers treat them
with respect.” (Stone, Foglesong, & Cole, 2009, p. 50). The Report considers a question that
could not be answered at the time: “Will the management and oversight improvements persist if
the consent decree ends?” (Stone, Foglesong, & Cole, 2009, p. ii). In 2009 the Federal Court
lifted its consent decree and entered into a Transition Agreement. By 2013 the Transition
Agreement was withdrawn, and the Inspector General assumed full oversight of LAPD.

Officer Involved Shootings
In 2014, an unarmed black man, Ezell Ford, was shot by an LAPD officer and the family settled
with the City for $1.5 million (Arange, 2018). On July 11, 2016, Joseph Mann, a 50-year old
black male, was shot by an LA County Sheriff Department’s officer. The family settled with the
City for $719,000 (Rainey & Romero, 2018). In 2018, Anthony Weber, a mixed-race 16-year-
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old, was shot dead by an LA County Sheriff’s Department officer. Even though the officers
were not charged, the Weber family settled with the City for $4 million. In FY 2016-2017, “the
Los Angeles Police Department paid nearly $81 million [emphasis added] in legal settlements
last fiscal year, a sharp increase as the city closed the books on several high-profile and costly
cases” (Winton, 2017, para 1).
In 2015, LAPD officers opened fire 45 times as compared to 23 times in 2014, with 19
people being killed by police gunfire in 2015 (Mather, 2015). In November 2015, the Board of
Police Commissioners requested the Inspector General (IG) to conduct a review of LAPD’s
policies and practices with the goal of reducing use-of-force incidents. The Board instructed the
IG to compare LAPD’s use of force policies, investigations and training with those of Dallas,
Las Vegas, San Diego, and Washington, D.C. These instructions came after Matt Johnson,
president of the Board of Police Commissioners, described the upward trend in officer-involved
shootings, as an alarming development (Mather, 2015).
In May of 2016, LAPD’s Police Commission meetings were being interrupted
continuously by activists demanding changes to LAPD’s handling of African-American
residents. “Last year, eight out of 38 people struck by LAPD gunfire – or 21% - were black.
African Americans make up about 9% of the city’s population” (Mather, 2016b, para 7).
Following this, in June of 2016, a survey published by the Center for the Study of Los Angeles at
Loyola Marymount University noted that there was still skepticism about the LAPD among
African Americans. “Despite two decades [emphasis added] of efforts to improve relations, Los
Angeles County law enforcement is still struggling to build trust among African-American
residents” (Mather, 2016a, para 1).
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Also, in June of 2016, legislators for the State of California ‘killed’ various bills that
were intended to increase the transparency of LAPD by the release of police video footage and
internal disciplinary investigations. “Law enforcement groups argue strongly against the efforts
to increase transparency… [Senator Mark] Leno has said the group’s influence is so powerful at
the Capitol that a state-wide ballot measure might be the only way to loosen police disclosure
laws” (Dillon, 2016, para 10).
On October 6, 2016, the IG issued its report: Comparative review of Selected Agencies,
Investigations, and Training on the Use of Force: OIG Final Report (Los Angeles Police
Commission, 2016). The report covered the years of 2011 to 2015 and compared the Dallas, Las
Vegas, San Diego, and Metro DC police departments to LAPD. The report covered officerinvolved shooting incidents, use of force policies, and use of force training. “The OIG found
that the main differences between the departments involve their use of force policies, their level
of transparency with regard to use of force incidents, the manner and frequency of officer
training, and the support provided to officers after a use-of-force incident” (Los Angeles Police
Commission, 2016, p. 1).
In comparing these police departments, the OIG noted that other departments’ policies
include language that deadly force should only be used as the last resort. Also included in these
policies is the requirement for officers to emphasize de-escalation tactics first, prior to using
deadly force. When this Report was issued in 2016, the LAPD’s use of force policy did not
include language that conveyed those policy definitions. Subsequently, the Board of Police
Commissioners mandated that LAPD modify its use of force policy to embrace the concepts of
de-escalation and exhaustion of reasonable alternatives.
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In February 2017, Alexander Bustamante, the Inspector General at the time, reported on
LAPD’s use of less-lethal force (tasers, beanbag shotgun, and 40mm less-lethal launcher). The
report noted that “the department has been working to ensure de-escalation concepts (including
the appropriate use of less-lethal options) are integrated into all Department use of force training,
in accordance with the Commission’s direction” (Los Angeles Police Commission, 2017a, p. 17).
On April 12, 2017, LA’s Chief of Police, Charlie Beck, recommended that the Board of
Police Commissioners adopt a Revised Use of Force Policy. Chief Beck recommended that the
following statement be added to the Preamble to Use of Force: “Officers shall attempt to control
an incident by using time, distance, communications, and available resources in an effort to deescalate the situation, whenever it is safe and reasonable to do so” (Beck, 2017, p.1). This
revised use of force policy was approved by the Board of Police Commissioners on April 18,
2017. Following up on this revised policy, the Los Angeles Times reported that “the move comes
after a year in which the Police Commission ruled eight shootings by LAPD officers were
unjustified – the highest number in at least a decade, according to a Times analysis of nearly 440
shootings reviewed since 2007” (Mather & Chang, 2017, para 9).
The California Department of Justice (CDOJ) released the Use of Force Incident
Reporting for 2017 in which it noted that in Los Angeles, 741 people experienced police use of
force that led to serious bodily injury or death. In only 349 of these incidents citizens were
confirmed to have been armed, yet the officers thought 454 were armed (Office of the Attorney
General, 2017a).
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Racial Profiling
On November 15, 2016, the Los Angeles Times reported that the Police Commission was
investigating the issue of racial profiling by LAPD. LAPD presented a report to the Police
Commission on how LAPD and other agencies investigate alleged biased policing. According to
this report, in the 1,356 complaints there was no bias (Wynter, 2016). This departmental report,
which included a survey of 2,000 residents identified a disparity of perceptions among residents.
When asked if they believe that the police are honest and trustworthy, less than 50% of African
Americans agreed but whites, Latinos and Asians were at least 70% in agreement (Wynter,
2016). Although LAPD had made various reforms to improve diversity in its ranks and reduce
bias, the report noted that LAPD needs to continue working on ways to maintain and improve the
level of trust that is so essential for policing.

Increased Oversight, Transparency and Accountability
On May 2, 2017, the Inspector General’s Office issued its report on the progress that LAPD had
made in implementing National Best Practices. The areas that the IG focused on were: “adopting
the principles of external and internal procedural justice; prevention of biased policing;
establishing a culture of transparency and accountability; collection and reporting of data;
policies and practices relating to use of force; stop and search policies; and expanding
community policing” (Los Angeles Police Commission, 2017b, p. 2). In summary, the Report
stated that LAPD had met the requirements to be either fully or partially in line with the
recommendations.
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A key point in the Report is that “law enforcement culture embraces a ‘guardian mindset’
to build public trust and legitimacy, and that agencies adopt the concept of procedural justice as
the guiding principle for their policies and practices, both external and internal” (Los Angeles
Police Commission, 2017b, p. 3). The report highlighted the fact that LAPD had created a
Community Safety Partnership in collaboration with the City Housing Authority. Under this
partnership, officers must live in the communities of eight public housing developments for at
least five years. With the success of this experiment, for example a major drop in crime, LAPD
expanded the program to Harvard Park.
In May 2017, Los Angeles voters approved a new law, Charter Amendment C, that
created an all-citizen, disciplinary review board of LAPD. Activists claim that this charter would
end up favoring officers who are accused of misconduct. “For one thing, the measure allows
officers accused of misconduct to choose whether their case will be reviewed by the partial board
[one civilian and two high-ranking LAPD officers] or all civilian board” (Delgadillo, 2017, para
4). The implication is that the officer would choose whichever board would be more lenient.
Tim Lynch, director of the libertarian Cato Institute’s Project on Criminal Justice, said “the idea
of civilian review always sounds appealing…but when you look into the way it actually works, it
can be vulnerable to political manipulations, inadequate funding, and staffing…” (Delgadillo,
2017, para 7).
In February 2018 the Board of Police Commissioners unanimously elected Mark Smith
as the new Inspector General. Since the Board recently adopted a more hands-on approach to
oversight, Smith noted that one of his goals was “to provide a constant source of accountability –
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monitoring the department consistently, not just after a crisis” (Mather, 2018b, para 10). Having
served on the Board of Directors for the National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law
Enforcement, Smith embraced the values of transparency and accountability as well as
strengthening civilian oversight. Additionally, he served as a Constitutional Policing Advisor for
the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department where he was responsible for advising the Sheriff on a
number of issues including accountability, adherence to best practices, policies, procedures and
other duties. The appointment of Mark Smith as IG is notable in that as Inspector General, he has
more authority to make constructive changes to increase officer accountability.
On March 20, 2018, the Police Commission voted 4-0 that video from body cameras and
patrol cars will now be released for public viewing. “Transparency and accountability are the
bedrocks of building public trust [said Commissioner Shane Murphy Goldsmith]. The public has
a right to see these videos” (Mather, 2018a, para 4). LAPD’s Chief Charlie Beck was concerned
that Charter Amendment C would only offer a limited, incomplete snapshot of an incident,
especially without any other evidence being offered to the public. Under this policy, critical
incident videos would become available within 45 days of the incident. The Police Commission
or the police chief has the option to release other non-critical incident videos if they decide it is
in the public interest. District Attorney Jackie Lacey noted that the new policy would “make
seeking justice in these politically-charged cases more difficult” (Mather, 2018a, para 7). The
board of the police officers’ union (Los Angeles Police Protective League) agreed with the
district attorney. For the release to be delayed by 14 days, the police chief and two liaisons
selected by the Police Commission would have to vote unanimously. Reflecting on the new
policy, Barry Friedman, Director of the Policing Project, observed:

55

Cities throughout the country are struggling with when to release body camera
video after an officer-involved shooting. Too often these decisions are made ad
hoc, under pressure. We commend the Police Commission for developing a clear
policy to guide these decisions and doing so with substantial input from the
broader LA community (Staff and News Service Reports, 2018, para 20).

Key Legislative Developments
By 2015, the long history of problems in the LAPD, as well as a rash of incidents across the
state, made police reform a salient issue in California politics. With increasing pressure from
groups like Black Lives Matter, the Democratically controlled California legislature was spurred
into action. Over the next four years, the legislature would enact four significant pieces of
legislation designed to increase the accountability of police officers and the transparency of
investigations of officer-involved shootings.
In an effort to reach the goal of California police departments being more transparent and
accountable, the California legislature enacted the Racial and Identity Profiling Act of 2015
(RIPA), which has been called “truly groundbreaking legislation – the first of its kind and scale
in the United States” (Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, 2019, p. 1). Regarding
detentions and searches, almost all California law enforcement agencies are now required to
collect and scrutinize the demographic data (Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board,
2019). To assure that this data was collected and public reports produced, the Act created the
RIPA Advisory Board (Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, 2019). This Board’s first
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report was in 2018, and the 2019 report outlines the data to be collected and which agencies are
participating. The Board’s 2020 report will have a detailed analysis of all the data, and the
Board’s goal is that the data can be the first step for improving trust and respect between the
police and the communities (Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, 2019).
In July of 2017, a Bay area assemblyman, Phil Teng, introduced Assembly Bill 748
focused on “making public footage from police shootings and other cases considered to be in the
public interest, such as police uses of force or violent political protests” (Dillon, 2017, para 2).
Nearly a year later, in April of 2018, Senator Nancy Skinner (D-Berkeley) introduced SB 1421,
designed to make records available to the public associated with investigations of officerinvolved shootings. According to the bill’s sponsor, “SB 1421 ensures that when officers use
serious or deadly force, engage in sexual assault or are dishonest in carrying out their duties, the
public is informed” (sd09.senate.ca.gov, para 3). SB 1421 now requires that officer personnel
records, complaints and investigations are now available for public inspection (Skinner, 2018).
In California, two bills addressing the improvement of investigative transparency were
signed into law by California Governor Jerry Brown in September of 2018. These laws went
into effect on January 1, 2019. The ACLU of Southern California commented that “the
legislature passed SB 1421 because communities demanded an end to the secrecy cloaking
police misconduct and use of force” (Casiano, 2018, para 3).
Before this legislation was enacted, neither the public nor prosecutors had access to
police misconduct records. The legislation represents a significant shift in a state that has been
known for secrecy with regard to police misconduct. In the 1970s, LAPD officers were enraged
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that their past complaints started to appear in court cases. Surprisingly, LAPD shredded four
tons of personnel records beginning in the 1940s (Dillon, 2018b). This decision resulted in over
100 criminal cases against officers accused of misconduct being purged. Police unions opposed
the 2018 legislation and have filed lawsuits arguing that the law should not be retroactive
(Arango, 2019).
In August of 2019, after months of wrangling between pro-reform groups and law
enforcement interests, the California legislature enacted AB 392. The new law raises the bar in
assessing the lawfulness of police shootings. Prior to the new law’s enactment, the prevailing
standard was that of objective reasonableness, as set forth in the Supreme Court’s 1989 decision
in Graham v. Connor. Under AB 392, the question is whether an officer’s use of potentially
deadly force was necessary. The definition of necessary was removed as a compromise to the
police, and due to this Black Lives Matter withdrew their support for the legislation (Coaston,
2019). Typically prosecutors do not file criminal charges against an officer, however, with this
new law prosecutors can scrutinize what happened prior to the incident of deadly force.
Departments will need to be more aggressive about training officers in de-escalation strategies
(Chabria, A., 2019). However, not everyone was satisfied with the new law.

Countervailing Developments
The election of Alex Villanueva as the thirty-third sheriff of Los Angeles County in 2018
represented something of a setback in the movement for greater oversight and accountability.
Prior to taking office, Villanueva declared that he would dispose of two constitutional policing
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advisors who managed many legal matters ranging from the use-of-force policy as well as
dispensing of discipline (Stoltze, 2018). Villanueva’s win is another example of the strong
opposition that police unions typically have against any form of accountability. The deputy
sheriffs’ union spent more than $1.3 million on behalf of Villanueva. The former sheriff,
McDonnell, created a shooting analysis review committee, partly based on the advice of the
policing advisors, that would have “analyzed deputies with multiple shootings and make risk
management recommendations about removing deputies from patrol duties” (Stoltze, 2018, para.
11).

Civilian Oversight in Los Angeles.: Current Structure and Process
Any citizen can file a complaint against an LAPD officer by phone, in person at any police
office, with the Internal Affairs group (IAG), the Police Commission or the Inspector General.
The Inspector General reviews all complaints before assigning them for investigation by a
trained supervisor. Some complaints may be eligible for mediation with the hopes that this leads
to stronger relationships between LAPD and the community.
Due to Los Angeles voters approving Charter Amendment C in 2017, LAPD officers
have the option to choose an all-civilian Board of Rights panel (three civilian members) or the
Board of Police Commissioners. There is no civilian review board per se to receive complaints.
The Board of Rights came into existence in June of 2019, and the Police Commission established
what qualifications a resident must have to be chosen. This Board of Rights was established as a
temporary, experimental body, for a period of two years, after which LAPD must report on its
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effectiveness (Human Rights Watch, n.d.). “In the current disciplinary system, once a complaint
against an officer is initiated, it is investigated and rises through the chain of command up to the
chief. If an allegation is sustained, a commanding officer recommends discipline. The chief can
either accept or modify the punishment” (Puente, 2019, para 9). The officer has the opportunity
to appeal the punishment to the Board of Rights, and both the officer and the department have
the right to have witnesses testify. At this point the panel can either find the officer guilty or not
guilty as well as adjusting the chief’s recommended discipline (Puente, 2019).
Complaints are investigated by the Internal Affairs Group with oversight and review by
the Inspector General’s department. Depending on the complaint, the resident also has the
option of having the complaint moved to mediation (a confidential process whereby the resident
and the police officer meet face-to-face with a mediator present) or the alternative complaint
resolution (resident meets with the police officer for a discussion facilitated by an LAPD
supervisor). However, if at any time a complainant is not happy with the Internal Affairs
decision, he or she may request a case review by the IG’s department.
For all officer-involved shootings within the LAPD, the Board of Police Commissioners
has the sole authority to decide if an officer’s actions were consistent with Department policy.
What is notable about this is that the Chief of Police cannot change this decision; however, the
Chief of Police can impose discipline on an officer based on the Board’s decision. This Report
outlined nine recommendations for action by the LAPD, some of which had specific deadlines.
One of those is that LAPD must make a detailed presentation to the Board of Police
Commissioners within 90 days outlining the use of force training required for officers,
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specifically de-escalation training and use of less-lethal weapons, and a policy regarding the
release of video footage of use of force incidents.

Assessing Civilian Oversight in Los Angeles
LAPD has made some progress in improving transparency and accountability. However, when
one considers that the Rodney King incident was in 1991 and it is now 2020, there have been 29
years of disconnect between LAPD and its citizens. LAPD has a long history of police issues
that may subside for a time but resurface and continue to project the image of not being
transparent and accountable. Despite an Inspector General and the LA Police Commission,
problems are still occurring. “Members of the Los Angeles Police Commission expressed
concern that the disproportionate number of black drivers stopped by an elite unit is damaging
the public’s trust in the police department” (Chang, 2019, para 1). Although this elite unit,
“Metro,” is proactive in addressing crime as directed by the LAPD Command Staff, “black
drivers [are stopped] at a rate more than five times their share of the population” (Chang, 2019,
para 2).
For civilian review to be effective in increasing accountability, review boards need to
identify a way to neutralize the opposition of unions by developing a plan to become partners
with the unions for the benefit of the community. An example of this was the passage of
California’s Senate Bill 1421. In California, as elsewhere, police unions have opposed reforms
that would promote greater transparency and accountability. However, SB 1421 was negotiated
with the California Police Chiefs Association. SB 1421 is an example of political groups
negotiating and formulating a plan to meet the communities’ needs.
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The role of upper management within police departments, starting with the chief, is
crucial to reform. Research suggests “that fair policing may be linked to fair supervision” and
that “the relationship between internal and external procedural justice is mediated by officers’
self-legitimacy and compliance with instructions and policies” (Van Craen & Skogan, 2017, p.5).
Supervisors need to lead by example and show the rank-and-file officers what it looks like to be
an officer who is focused on the community. Rank-and-file officers need procedural justice
training, and beyond that supervisors and managers should also be trained in internal procedural
justice (Van Craen & Skogan, 2017,). To state this differently, the “challenge of police
accountability is not about how to get a few bad apples but how to fix the organization [emphasis
added]” (Harris, 2012, p. 241).
As more police commissions, inspectors general, and courts support police
accountability, it is possible that California may lead the nation in this regard. For LAPD, there
have been many efforts and reforms to improve transparency and accountability; however,
success has been fleeting. As the governing body of LAPD, the Board of Police Commissioners
has the opportunity, as well as the responsibility, to improve the legitimacy of the police
department.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CASE STUDY: NEW YORK CITY

New York City, with its volatile mixture of immigrant populations, has had a long history of
conflict between police and the communities they serve. In 1950, 18 organizations came
together to form the Permanent Coordination Committee on Police and Minority Groups. Its
purpose was to develop a plan to reduce police malfeasance, especially as it relates to minority
groups (NYC Civilian Complaint Review Board, n.d.). In response to this concern, in 1953 the
NYPD created its first Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB), consisting of three deputy
police commissioners. Police officers reviewed citizen complaints, and the commissioners
decided on any discipline, if any.
In 1965, former federal judge Lawrence E. Walsh was appointed by Mayor John Lindsay
for the purpose of making suggestions to improve the NYPD. In order to inculcate public
assurance in the fair administration of civilian complaints, Walsh’s report declared that there
must be civilians on the board (NYC Civilian Complaint Review Board, n.d.). Despite
opposition from the Patrolman’s Benevolent Association (PBA) and for the first time in the
city’s history, the mayor appointed four citizens to the CCRB.
In 1986, the city council passed legislation to restructure the CCRB. Under this
legislation, the mayor appointed six civilians to the board, and the police commissioner
appointed six non-uniformed police officers. Under the new law, the Civilian Complaint
Investigations Bureau hired civilians to investigate complaints; however, NYPD employees
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supervised these civilians. In 1988, there were a series of violent incidents in Tompkins Square
Park. A special report on these incidents found that no effort was made to limit force, and the
officers used force because they could (NYC Civilian Complaint Review Board, n.d.). The
Tompkins Square incidents and the ensuing report produced public support for an all-civilian
review board.
In 1993, Mayor David Dinkins and the NYC City Council created a new CCRB with an
all-civilian composition. The CCRB was given subpoena power to obtain film coverage from
media outlets. However, the agency was underfunded and unable to investigate a large number
of complaints. On April 2, 2012, CCRB and NYPD entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding in which CCRB agreed to undertake “administrative prosecution of all civilian
complaints against NYPD uniformed officers which have been substantiated by CCRB” (New
York City Government, p. 1). However, there are provisions within this document that
authorized the Police Commissioner to deny or reduce the recommendations from CCRB.

High-Profile Incidents of Excessive Use of Force by NYPD
Despite the creation of CCRB, the decades that followed witnessed a series of high-profile
incidents in which police were accused of using excessive force against civilians. In 1994, a 13year-old African American, Nicholas Heyward, Jr., was shot and killed by an NYPD officer who
mistook a toy gun for the real thing. No charges were filed against the officer. In 2000, four
NYPD officers were acquitted of murder after they shot and killed an African immigrant,
Amadou Diallo, when he reached for his wallet. The Diallo shooting, and the acquittal of the
officers, produced considerable unrest in the African-American community.

64

A month after the officers were acquitted in the Diallo shooting case, Malcolm Ferguson,
a 23-year-old African-American man who was unarmed, was shot and killed by an undercover
NYPD officer. The shooting happened only a few blocks from where Amadou Diallo had been
shot. The death was determined to be accidental. In that same month, March 2000, an AfricanAmerican father of two, Patrick Moses Dorismond, was shot and killed by an undercover NYPD
officer in an altercation associated with an illegal drug transaction. Again, no charges were filed.
Between 2010 to 2014, there were 104 substantiated cases of NYPD’s excessive use of
force, and only 37 officers received discipline (Officer of the Inspector General, 2015). In fiscal
year 2013, more than 9,500 claims were filed against NYPD officers which cost the city $137.2
million (New York City Comptroller, 2014). According to NYPD, in the five years ending in
2015, the City defended itself against more than 15,000 lawsuits, which cost the City more than
$202 million. In addition to these monies, the mayor allocated $4.5 million to the New York
City law department to hire 30 new attorneys and 10 new paralegals to defend the City (New
York City Department of Investigation, 2015c).

Stop and Frisk Controversy
In the 1990s, under the leadership of Police Commissioner William Bratton, NYPD adopted a
policy of aggressive stop and frisk. The Supreme Court held in 1968 that police officers having
reasonable suspicion that crime was afoot could temporarily detain and question suspects and
during such detentions were allowed to pat down suspects’ outer garments to locate concealed
weapons (Terry v. Ohio, 1968). NYPD’s policy went well beyond what the Supreme Court

65

authorized in Terry v. Ohio. “From 2002 to 2006, the number of stops made by the NYPD
exploded from 97,296 to 508,540, a rise of 422% [emphasis added]” (Kupferberg, 2008, p. 158).
By 2008, NYPD officers were detaining more than 500,000 persons per year, most of whom
were black or Latino. Only a small percentage of these stops led to arrests and fewer still
resulted in convictions. On average, between 2002 and 2013, only 14% of detentions resulted in
convictions (NYCLU.org, n.d.).
In 1999 a federal class-action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York, (Daniels v.
City of New York), the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) accused NYPD of conducting
illegal racial profiling and violating citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights. After much negotiation
between the parties, Judge Shira Scheindlin approved a consent decree and continued oversight
of the case until the decree expired in December, 2007. Because the decree was a result of a
civil suit, the judge was the sole enforcer of a weak agreement with no monitor and no
enforcement mechanisms. Although ordered to produce various data, NYPD never complied,
which led to CCR filing another lawsuit in 2008.
There is little doubt that NYPD’s stop and frisk program adversely affected policecommunity relations. “The practice of stop-and-frisk has left an impression on residents in New
York City and beyond, with many believing that the practice is motivated by racial or age-based
bias and that it limits the rights of citizens in public spaces” (Eterno, Barrow, & Silverman, 2016,
p. 182).
In January of 2008, a second lawsuit was filed to challenge NYPD’s stop-and-frisk
policy. In Floyd, et al. v. City of New York, et al. (2013), Judge Shira Scheindlin ruled that the
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NYPD policy was unconstitutional. The judge further ruled that an independent monitor should
be appointed to oversee efforts to remedy the constitutional violations. “After hundreds of
thousands of legally questionable stop-and-frisks, several hundred million dollars of legal
settlements and countless protests on the streets of New York City, the nation’s largest police
department is now under the oversight of US District Judge Shira Scheindlin” (Winston, 2013,
para 1). According to Judge Scheindlin, “NYPD conducted 4.4 million stop and frisks between
January 2004 and June 2012” (Floyd v. City of New York, 2013, p. 1). Out of those stops, 80%
were of blacks or Hispanics (Floyd v. City of New York, 2013).
Following Judge Scheindlin’s order that a court-appointed monitor should be engaged to
remedy NYPD’s widespread constitutional violations, the New York City Council enacted Local
Law No. 70 in June 2013. The new law established the Office of Inspector General (OIGNYPD) to oversee the NYPD. The OIG-NYPD is part of New York City’s Department of
Investigation (DOI), and the OIG reports to the DOI’s Commissioner. Philip Eure became the
first-ever Inspector General for the NYPD in May 2014 (Brennan Center for Justice, para 1).
Another facet of Judge Scheindlin’s order was the implementation of police wearing
body-worn cameras in an effort to provide a detached review of the stops and frisks where it is
not just officer’s word vs. civilian’s word (Davie, 2020). As chair of the CCRB, Fred Davie
announced that, without body-worn camera footage, unsubstantiated determinations were at
51%. However, with body-worn camera footage unsubstantiated decisions were reduced to 23%
(Davie, 2020). This reduction occurred between November 2017 and early 2020. “Body-worn
camera technology is a necessary tool for civilian oversight of police in New York City” (Davie,
2010, para. 7).
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Discriminatory Enforcement of Subway Fare Evasion
It is well known that in NYC many people jump the turnstiles to avoid paying subway
fares. Between 2011 and 2015 the commander in charge of South Brooklyn police station
ordered officers to cite blacks and Latinos for this offense while allowing whites and Asians to
go unticketed (Goldstein & Southall, 2019). This racial profiling did not stop in 2015. Between
October 2017 and June 2019, 73% of those who were ticketed for fare evasion were blacks and
Hispanics. Additionally, among those jumping the turnstiles, more than 90% of blacks
and Hispanics were arrested rather than ticketed (Goldstein and Southall, 2019). This
information became public because Lt. Edwin Raymond sued the police department for being
denied a promotion based on his race (Goldstein & Southall, 2019).

The Eric Garner Case
In July 2014, two white NYPD officers approached Eric Garner, a 43-year-old African-American
man, on the grounds that he was engaging in unlicensed street vending by selling single
cigarettes. Garner continuously denied that and said that he was breaking up a fight. During the
ongoing confrontation, Officer Pantaleo approached Garner from behind and placed him in a
chokehold. Section 203-11 of NYPD’s Patrol Guide explicitly and unequivocally prohibits
officers from using chokeholds, but Officer Pantaleo deployed it nevertheless. There were a
number of chokehold incidents in the few years prior to Eric Garner. Due to these incidents, the
NYPD “spent $35 million to retrain patrol officers not to employ strangleholds…” (Winston,
2019, para. 3).
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While Garner was face down on the sidewalk with the officer on top of him, Garner
protested eleven times that he could not breathe. The officer maintained his chokehold and
Garner lost consciousness. By the time an ambulance arrived, Garner was dead. Although a
Staten Island grand jury voted not to indict Officer Pantaleo, he was fired in August 2019, five
years after Eric Garner’s death (Barrett, 2019). During Pantaleo disciplinary trial, the City’s
Police Academy head trainer watched the video and said that “it meets the definition of a
chokehold” (SpectrumNews NY1, para 1). In a related civil suit, Eric Garner’s family received a
$5.9 million settlement from the City of New York (Goodman, 2015).
The Eric Garner tragedy led to the new Inspector General’s first report. This report
focused on ten substantiated chokehold cases, each with a different scenario and outcome.
Although the CCRB recommended administrative charges in nine of the ten cases, NYPD’s
Department Advocate’s Office dismissed these recommendations and chose either lesser
penalties or no discipline. Although the Police Commissioner made the final determination, he
also rejected CCRB’s recommendation and chose a lesser penalty or no discipline (New York
City Department of Investigation, 2015a).
In late 2016, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Justice Department recommended
federal civil rights charges against the officer who killed Garner (Benner, 2019). However, in
July 2019, President Trump’s Attorney General, William Barr, decided that no federal charges
would be filed.

Reform and Resistance
In October 2015 the OIG released a report on the use of force by NYPD, analyzing trends,
reporting, de-escalation, training, and discipline. Between 2010 and 2014, the CCRB
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investigated and found that in 179 cases there was excessive use of force (New York City
Department of Investigation, 2015b). Despite verification by OIG researchers of this excessive
use of force, the “NYPD Commissioner refused to impose any form of Discipline… [emphasis
added]” (NYC Department of Investigation, 2015b, p. 1).
Following this report, NYPD revised the use-of-force policies and procedures as well as a
new Patrol Guide regarding the use of force. Although OIG approved these changes, NYPD
advised that these reforms would not take effect until or around April 2016 (final implementation
was June 1, 2016). In April 2018 the OIG reported that the NYPD made significant changes in
the use-of-force reporting. However, the OIG noted that, despite these improvements, officers
needed to improve documentation of all excessive force cases and not under-report these
incidents (New York City Department of Investigation, 2018).
In August of 2018, the NYPD Deputy Commissioner for Legal Matters Lawrence Byrne
(Byrne) responded to the April OIG report noted above. Byrne stated that in 2015, NYPD
created a new unit within the Department’s Legal Bureau, Police Action Litigation Section
(PALS). PALS is comprised of uniform and civilian members led by Department attorneys and
have led to highly desirable and beneficial results. In his scathing comments, Byrne believes that
the report used unreliable information and antiquated methodology (New York City Police
Department, 2018). It is not surprising that the OIG and the NYPD have conflicting reports on
the same subject. It is also possible that both departments’ reports used different data to inform
their conclusions. It is beyond the scope of this research to conduct an in-depth analysis of both
reports to ascertain the differences. Since the OIG is conducting oversight of NYPD, it is
understandable that NYPD would respond with a favorable assessment of itself.
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One of the NYPD changes was implementation of officers being required to fill out a
Threat, Resistance or Injury (TRI) form on every use-of-force incident. The goal of the TRI is to
enhance supervision and accountability while analyzing what conditions officers use force. The
OIG noted one of the problems with the TRI is that “NYPD does not have sufficient controls in
place to assure that TRIs are completed when arrest reports say that no force was used but
officers in fact used force” (New York City Department of Investigation, 2018, p. 2). OIG Phil
Eure succinctly addressed this issue by saying:
A healthy relationship between the public and NYPD requires transparency and
accountability – especially when it comes to police use of force. Failures to
comprehensively and accurately document use of force by police officers are not
only missed opportunities to improve policing, but risk jeopardizing the trust
NYPD has worked to build with communities across the City (Office of the
Inspector General, 2018, p. 1).

The OIG Inspector General Eure “issued three reports during 2018 that faulted the NYPD
for failing to completely document the use of force by cops, properly staff its sex-crimes division
and analyze brutality and false-arrest policies and procedures” (McCarthy & Golding, 2019,
para. 2). When police departments refuse to implement mandated changes by an inspector
general, the public will continue to distrust the police and will continue to believe they are not
transparent and accountable.
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“Quality of Life” Enforcement
Another controversy involving NYPD policies and practices involves what is known as “quality
of life enforcement.” Quality-of-life enforcement focuses on misdemeanor offenses such as
disorderly conduct, public consumption of alcohol, graffiti, public urination, panhandling, and
unlicensed street vending. The theory is that left unchecked, such behaviors will lead to a
proliferation of more serious crimes (Wilson & Kelling, 1982). Although NYPD claimed that
quality-of-life enforcement was a key tool in fighting more serious crime, the OIG’s report found
no evidence demonstrating “a clear and direct link between an increase in the summons and
misdemeanor arrest activity and a related drop in felony crime” (New York City Department of
Investigation, 2016, p.3).
Following this report, Mayor Bill De Blasio signed into law on June 13, 2016, the
Criminal Justice Reform Act. This Act directed the NYPD to create documentation to assist
officers on the proper enforcement of quality-of-life offenses (New York City Department of
Investigation, 2016). Under this law, NYPD officers have the option of issuing civil summonses
rather than criminal warrants which cause incarceration. This Act has the potential to reduce the
tendency to incarcerate people rather than considering alternative measures to deal with minor
offenses.
The Misdemeanor Justice Project conducted by John Jay College in New York did a sixmonths, post-implementation review of the Criminal Justice Reform Act. This review
“shows that there continues to be a decline in the issuance of summonses for the five CJRA
behaviors. When issued, the vast majority (89%) of summonses for these five behaviors were
issued as a civil rather than a criminal summons post-implementation” (Misdemeanor Justice
Project, 2018, p. 7). The Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice supported this independent report.
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Focus on Transparency
In New York State, Civil Rights Law §50-A states explicitly that “all personnel records of
police, firefighters and correction officers used to evaluate performance toward continued
employment and promotion…shall be considered confidential and not subject to inspection or
review without the express written consent of such officer…except as mandated by lawful court
order” (New York State Senate, 2018, para. 1). Under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL),
the CCRB requested ten years of final disciplinary records, and NYPD refused the request based
on Law 50-A. Due to a group of criminal justice professionals addressing accountability and
transparency, the NYPD resolved to make many changes to its officer disciplinary system after
this group suggested that the police department take steps to increase its accountability and
transparency (Toussaint, 2019).
On December 11, 2018, in the case of New York Civil Liberties Union v. New York City
Police Department, filed in a New York State Court of Appeals, the judge ruled that Law 50-A
can be used by the NYPD to withhold personnel records. However, the Court of Appeals
reversed the State Supreme Court and ruled that these records cannot be made public based on
the State Civil Rights Law (Robbins, 2018). Although Law 50-A was not repealed, NYPD
continues to support an amendment that focuses on serious misconduct cases in which they will
release records involved in the case (Tarinelli, 2019).
On February 19, 2019, the State Appeals Court ruled that, under New York law, police
body camera videos are open for public viewing; however, the Police Benevolent Association,
the officers’ union, derided the decision because it would invade the officers’ privacy
(Parascandola, 2019). However, NYPD’s Police Commissioner, James O’Neill, stated that “this
ruling is an important step forward for transparency and affirms what the NYPD believes”
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(Sisak, 2019, para. 5). In order to buttress police accountability with accessibility to this footage,
The Associated Press and other media outlets supported this decision by participating with
various court filings (Sisak, 2019). Since the Police Commissioner agreed with the decision and
noted that it is a step forward for transparency, the NYPD may become more transparent and
accountable in the future.
Communities United for Police Reform (CPR) is a grassroots organization whose goal is
to address and change police policies that are discriminatory and lead to abuse of New Yorkers.
There are more than 25 voting members and over 100 supporting members and partners
(Communities United for Police Reform, 2012). CPR developed the Safer NY Act, a package of
bills designed to increase police transparency, one of which is the PoliceStatAct (A05472Lentol/S1830-Hoylman). This Act requires police statewide to maintain records on
misdemeanor offenses, especially related to race, ethnicity and sex as well as deaths while in
police custody. In June of 2017, Assemblyman Lentol successfully moved this act (A05472) for
passage in the NY State Assembly (the lower house of the New York legislature) (Communities
United for Police Reform, 2017). The Senate version of this act (S.1830-B), sponsored by
Senator Brad Hoylman (D-NYC), was stalled in the finance committee as the legislative session
closed for the year. The 2020 legislative session begins in January. Senator Hoylman will
introduce this act again for the committee process and has designated this act as a priority for his
office (B. Phillips. personal communication, October 31, 2019).
CPR also successfully advocated for the “Right to Know Act,” which became effective
on October 19, 2018. The Act requires officers to give every person they stop a business card
which includes their name and rank. Additionally, if the officer does not have an objective
reason for conducting a search, the person has the right to refuse the officer’s request for a search
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and officers must record the giving or refusing consent, either by body camera or in writing
(NYC Civilian Complaint Review Board, n.d.). It is too early to assess whether this Act will be
effective and if the community believes it will be a vehicle of transparency and accountability.

A Major Policy Change Affecting Civilian Oversight
On Tuesday, November 5, 2019, NYC approved Ballot Question 2, “Civilian Complaint Review
Board Charter Amendment.” This amendment to the NYC charter made a number of important
enhancements to the ability of the CCRB to conduct meaningful oversight of NYPD, including
the following:


Increased the size of CCRB from thirteen to fifteen members and allowed the city
council to appoint board members without mayoral approval;



Significantly increased CCRB’s budget;



Required that the City Police Commissioner provide an explanation whenever
CCRB’s disciplinary recommendations are not followed;



Allowed CCRB to delegate its subpoena power to the Executive Director to make
investigations more efficient (Ballotpedia.org).

Assessing Civilian Oversight in New York City
Although the NYPD was established in 1845, it wasn’t until 1965 that the mayor appointed four
citizens to the CCRB. Since this was not popular with the police, in 1986 the city council
instructed the CCRB to include six non-uniformed officers and six civilians supervised by
NYPD employees. Because of the violent incidents in Tompkins Square Park in 1988, the city
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council created a new CCRB in 1993 with an all civilian composition which, unfortunately, was
underfunded which hindered investigations. By 2012 the CCRB and NYPD entered into an
agreement in which the CCRB would handle the administrative prosecution of all civilian
complaints against officers. Unfortunately, the Police Commissioner could deny or reduce
CCRB’s recommendations.
Research conducted in 2012 cited statistics showing that Inspector General exonerates its
officers more often than not in contrast to the CCRB’s recommendations:


NYPD followed the CCRB’s recommendations in fewer than 10% of cases.



Of the more than 5,700 complaints filed in 2012, only 258 were found to have merit,
and in only 104 of these cases were officers disciplined.



Of the 175 cases in which CCRB recommended criminal charges, NYPD sought
charges in only seven. And in 76 of these cases, police officers received no
discipline.



In half of the 70 cases where CCRB recommended disciplinary action, officers were
given verbal instructions only, and officers received no discipline in 24 of these cases
(Ofer, 2016).

While CCRB was investigating complaints against NYPD, there were a number of
precincts where officers would not provide a complaint form to a citizen (Quigley & Hurowitz,
2018). Because of this, CCRB hand-delivered prepaid envelopes for mail-in complaint forms to
79 percent of precinct stations citywide. CCRB’s website advises complainants that they can go
to any precinct to request a complaint form, however, most complaints to CCRB are received via
phone, email and its website. In 2017 CCRB received 4,483 complaints, and some precincts
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gave citizens the correct CCRB form. However, there were numerous precincts that either gave
an internal affairs form or no form (Quigley & Hurowitz, 2018).
Starting in 2014 and due to a judge’s order, an Inspector General was appointed to review
all policies and practices and to make recommendations for changes where needed. The
Inspector General has made numerous recommendations in a series of reports. NYPD has
implemented only a few of them, is considering other recommendations, and has refused to
implement others. When the CCRB recommends discipline, the Police Commissioner either
reduces the discipline or refuses to issue any discipline. The main avenue for citizens to reach
any justice or settlement on NYPD’s excessive use of force is through litigation. New York City
has spent millions of dollars settling such lawsuits.
In June 2019, the Office of the Inspector General published its latest report on NYPD’s
compliance with mandated changes. It noted that the NYPD had made some required policy
changes relating to ethnicity, national origin, race and other protected statuses. Due to these
changes, the police cannot use these statuses as a means to initiate police action (Office of the
Inspector General, 2019). The public’s trust in police officers is negatively affected when
officers engage in biased policing.
Since the creation of the Racial Profiling and Bias-Based Policing complaint category in
2014, the public has made nearly 2,500 complaints of racially biased policing, all of which
resulted in investigations. “NYPD’s investigators have not substantiated any claims of the 1,918
complaints that were closed as of December 31, 2018” (Office of the Inspector General, 2019, p.
2).
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The CCRB and the Inspector General are effective in producing some changes to NYPD;
however, there is much work needed for citizens to believe that NYPD is transparent and
accountable. Hopefully, the Right to Know Act will improve citizens’ opinions. However, if the
Police Commissioner has the final say on what, if any, discipline is imposed, citizens will
continue to distrust NYPD because of the belief that police protect their own. As noted above,
CCRB and NYPD are at cross purposes when CCRB delivers mail-in complaint forms to
precincts, but many police precincts still give citizens their internal affairs complaint form.
Transparency and accountability cannot exist when citizens do not have access to the
proper complaint form. The CCRB needs to have additional powers if they are to stay relevant
and earn the trust of the community. With the Police Commissioner having the final word on
any discipline, it is not surprising that NYPD and CCRB are at odds. To describe this
contention, “…the Police Commissioner departed from the board’s recommended penalties 73
percent of the time…almost half of the most serious cases that were closed in 2017 ended with
no discipline [emphasis added]” (Mueller, 2018, para 8).
Nor can accountability and transparency exist when NYPD officers continue to lie, even
under oath in a courtroom. The New York Times investigation “found that on more than 25
occasions since January 2015, judges or prosecutors determined that a key aspect of an NYPD
officer’s testimony was probably untrue” (Goldstein, 2018, para 9). Videos of an officer’s
actions refuted what the officer said in court. In one case, an officer said that a woman in the
hallway dropped a laundry bag which he kicked, hit a hard object and found a gun in the bag.
The hallway surveillance video showed that there was no laundry bag and no gun. Testilying has
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been a problem within the NYPD for many years. “By 1994, a commission appointed to
investigate police corruption noted that lying to make cases stick was common enough for
‘testilying’ to become a well-known portmanteau” (Goldstein, 2018, para 64). New Yorkers, or
any community’s residents, deserve honest and credible police. Testilying is an issue for NYPD
that has not been adequately addressed by the command staff. In the case above about the
laundry bag, the woman had to appear in court 16 times and the officer was promoted to
detective.
Accountability will only happen when NYPD decides to become accountable and
transparent by partnering with CCRB and allowing thorough civilian investigations, handing
citizens the correct complaint form and ensuring that policies and procedures are followed by its
officers. NYPD has an inspector general, however, it is not easy to change an institution that has
been in existence for over 150 years. But with groups like CPR and continuing lawsuits, there is
the possibility of real accountability and transparency by NYPD in the future.
Another opening for transforming a police department is when a new chief of police is
hired. For example, in Syracuse, NY, a new police chief was hired on December 3, 2018. The
new chief, Kenton Buckner, was formerly chief in Little Rock, Arkansas, where there was no
civilian oversight. The Civilian Review Board received little cooperation from the Syracuse
Police Department when it came to information regarding citizen complaints, primarily use of
force issues. “While use of force complaints are a small fraction of total incidents that come to
the Board, the city has paid more than 5 million dollars over the past several years to settle them”
(Willis & Hatchett, 2018, para 7). Buckner has watched a forum on the department’s use of
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force and plans to meet with the Board before the end of the month. Although the Board is
preparing for a level of cooperation between the Board and the Syracuse Police Department, it is
too early to gauge what type of collaboration Buckner will develop. However, any work on
accountability may not be a priority since he was granted a one-year extension to become
certified as a sworn police officer in New York. The mayor and city hall’s lawyer believe that
Buckner can remain as a ‘civilian police chief,’ whether or not he passes a series of physical
fitness exams (Baker, 2019).
There are many hurdles for CCRB to be perceived as an agency that can change the
NYPD into a transparent and accountable department. CCRB, unfortunately, needs to improve
its visibility with New Yorkers. “Even when it’s functioning at its best, the CCRB is burdened
with overcoming at least a generation of New Yorkers who have perfectly good reasons to doubt
its legitimacy” (Quigley & Hurowitz, 2018, p. 32). The ballot measure approved in November
of 2019 did serve to increase CCRB’s visibility, and the fact that the measure passed so easily
suggests strong public support for CCRB’s mission. Since the hiring of the IG, the NYPD has
made some progress, though much work remains to be done. With the NYPD being the largest
police department in the nation, the changes being sought by the Inspector General may take
many years.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CASE STUDY: KANSAS CITY

The Office of Community Complaints (OCC) for Kansas City was established on September 25,
1969. In existence for more than fifty years, it is the oldest, civilian oversight of law
enforcement in the nation (National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement,
2014). Part of OCC’s mission is “to examine carefully each investigative file so as to ensure that
all efforts have been made to resolve the complaint” and “to report to the Board of Police
Commissioners any and all relevant issues and policy matters that may arise” (Kansas City
Police Department, 2019, n.d.). The Kansas City Police Department (KCPD) and OCC both
report to the Board of Police Commissioners (Board), which is appointed by the Governor of
Missouri. Kansas City is the only city in the nation whose police are governed by a governorappointed board; other police departments are governed by the mayor or city manager
(International City/County Management Association, 2016).
The incident that created the momentum for the creation of the OCC occurred February
5, 1967, when an African-American male was detained by a KCPD officer. During the
encounter, the man was beaten and had to be hospitalized. This incident was representative of
Kansas City’s history of “allegations of improper treatment, brutality or excessive force or other
wrongful conduct by the police towards minorities, especially African Americans” (Bushnell,
2014, p. 1). The man was charged with careless driving, failure to obey a lawful police order,
and resisting arrest. Attorney Sid Willens, who is white, represented him in court and was
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successful in having the charges dismissed. Even though he won this case, Willens understood
that the issue of racial bias would continue to surface (Bushnell, 2014, p. 11)
On April 4, 1968, Martin Luther King, Jr., was assassinated in Memphis, TN. King had
led the civil rights movement since the mid-1950s, and his assassination reverberated throughout
the nation with many cities erupting in riots. One of the cities experiencing these riots was
Kansas City, and on April 9, 1968, hundreds of young African Americans sought to have
schools closed in honor of King (Kansas City Public Library).
In the wake of the Kansas City riots, attorney Willens decided to study how other cities
were handling citizen complaints against police. “In a letter dated February 26, 1969, which
accompanied his proposal to the Chief of Police Clarence M. Kelley, Willens summarized the
considerable dissatisfaction in the manner in which the Department responded to citizens’
complaints” (Bushnell, 2014, p. 11). After numerous meetings among Willens, Board of Police
Commissioners, Police Chief Kelley, and citizens, the Office of Citizen Complaints opened on
September 25, 1969. Dr. Ben Morris Ridpath, a highly-respected minister, was appointed the
first director; Willie Walton and John Harvey assisted Dr. Ridpath (Garnett, 1971, p. 41). OCC
staff would review the complaints and, if feasible, Dr. Ridpath would preside over a conciliation
meeting between the officer and the complainant or he would refer the complaint to the police
Internal Affairs Unit (IAU) for investigation. As Director, Ridpath was responsible for all
communications among interested parties. Between September 25, 1969 and March 31, 1970,
OCC received 78 complaints, 64 of which were closed prior to March 31. Of those 64, 18
resulted in a reprimand to the officer or officers involved. The harshest penalty imposed was
forfeiture of days off.
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Evaluations of OCC
In 1972 the Kansas City Advisory Commission on Human Relations conducted a series of public
hearings on the effectiveness of OCC. In June, it released its report, which concluded that OCC:
 was “too closely identified with the police department to render it sufficiently effective
as an independent mechanism”
 had a “a predilection toward assuming the citizen’s word to be less trustworthy than the
officer’s”
 showed an “over-reliance on polygraph test and under-reliance on the conciliation
process”
 suffered from an “absence of full-time leadership on the part of the director as well as
his apparent lack of adequate skills and training in the field of investigations” (Advisory
Commission on Human Relations, 1972, pp. 5-6).

Some of the Advisory Commission’s recommendations included:
 OCC should maintain a direct line of communication with the Board rather than the
Chief of Police,
 right of appeal by citizens to the Board should be guaranteed,
 OCC should make increased use of the conciliation process,
 use of polygraph or lie detector should be strictly limited,
 OCC should conduct independent investigation in addition to those of the IAU, and
 the director should be a full-time position and additional staff with an adequate budget
to facilitate staffing. (Advisory Commission on Human Relations, 1972, p. 8).
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Under Missouri law (Chapter 84, Section 350, Revised Statutes of Missouri), city
auditors have authority to audit their city’s police department. Because OCC is technically part
of KCPD, the city auditor’s office in Kansas City has conducted a series of audits of OCC. The
first audit, concluded in March 2000, resulted in the following recommendations:
 filing a citizen complaint alleging police misconduct should be easier;
 improved communications on what OCC does;
 increased use of mediation;
 barriers exist that restrict access to the complaint process;
 all complaints should be accepted for initial review;
 complaints should be accepted at more locations;
 complaint forms should be available without staff assistance;
 the annual report should provide more information;
 a single database of OCC complaints (City's Auditor's Office, 2000, pp. 5-6).

The timeliness of the investigations needs to be improved. Between 1995-1998, the audit
found that IAU completed only 14% of investigations within the prescribed 30-day time frame
and 65% were completed within 60 days. On the other hand, between 1994 and mid-September
1999, OCC resolved 51% of complaints within the required ten days.
A follow-up audit was completed in April 2005 to further assess the effectiveness of
OCC. The 2000 Audit recommendation to add non-police locations for citizens to file a
complaint was implemented as well as the creation of a mediation program. Both IAU and OCC
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continued to miss prescribed deadlines for complaint processing (City's Auditor's Office, 2005,
p.5). Because citizens do not understand the OCC process, the auditor recommended that OCC
should survey both complainants and officers who are involved in the complaint (City's Auditor's
Office, 2005 p. 9). The auditor found that residents believe that OCC favors the police; and the
police believe OCC favors complainants (City's Auditor's Office, 2005 p. 6). One audit
recommendation was that the Board of Police Commissioners permit OCC to be included in
KCPD’s policy reviews, and that recommendation was implemented. Another recommendation
was for OCC to have complaints investigated by independent investigators (City's Auditor's
Office, 2005 p. 19). However, this recommendation was rejected by the Board of Police
Commissioners in April of 2007 (M. Benneken, OCC Executive Director, personal
communication, November 6, 2019).
In 1997, Pearl Fain succeeded Dr. Ridpath as OCC director, and she served in that
capacity until 2017. In 2014 the name of the office was changed to the Office of Community
Complaints in order to stress that anyone—not just citizens—can file a complaint. In January
2017 Merrell Bennekin became OCC’s newest executive director. “Among his priorities,
Bennekin said he wants to build on many of the changes Fain implemented. The changes include
increasing the agency’s transparency and public accountability and further strengthening its ties
to various communities in Kansas City. Another priority is to enhance the agency’s mediation
efforts” (Rice, 2017b, para. 9).
The total number of complaints filed between July 1, 2012, and June 30, 2017, was 2,392
(Figure 5.1). Out of 2,392, only 350 complainants decided to continue with the entire
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investigatory process. Of that 350, only 57 complaints were sustained, or 16% (K. Williams,
OCC Senior Legal Analyst, personal communication, July 20, 2017).

584

600
422

380

260
146

Source: Kansas City Office of Community Complaints

Figure 5.1: Complaints against KCPD Officers, 2012-2017

Civilian complaints against police can be costly for cities. Between January 1, 2013,
through December 31, 2017, the City of Kansas City paid $6,033,249 due to civilian complaints
in the categories of assault/battery, excessive force, false arrest, false imprisonment, and
negligence (M. Luster, KCPD Paralegal, personal communication, July 10, 2018).
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OCC: Structure and Process
OCC’s structure is very simple and its resources are very meager. The organization is headed by
an executive director who is appointed by and serves at pleasure of the Board of Police
Commissioners. The structure includes an assistant executive director and three legal analysts
who investigate citizen complaints, however, since 2016 the Board of Police Commissioners has
not approved filling the assistant director position. OCC does not have subpoena power. Its
review of complaints utilizes the record developed by Internal Affairs in their in-depth
investigation.
Any person can file a complaint against a KCPD officer by filling out a complaint form
which can be found online, at any police facility, via mail or with OCC. All complaints are
forwarded to OCC for the initial processing and possible resolution. If a resolution is not
reached, then OCC forwards all materials to IAU for an in-depth investigation. At this point,
IAU determines whether there was a violation of police policy and forwards that decision to
OCC. If OCC agrees with that determination, the file is closed; however, if OCC does not agree,
the investigation continues. Should OCC determine that there was a violation of policy and an
officer should be reprimanded, OCC sends the recommendation back to IAU.
Although there is an opportunity for IAU and OCC to agree on the resolution, an
agreement may not be possible at which point the case is forwarded to the Board who then
makes the final decision. These procedures are also outlined in KCPD’s Procedural Instruction
No. 15-12 (KCPD, 2014). This procedural instruction also covers who can file a complaint,
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which complaints cannot be investigated, how to process and investigate a complaint and
recommendations. KCPD also has Personnel Policy 308-3 which specifically addresses how
IAU will investigate a complaint and the proper responses of a police officer in this situation
(Kansas City, Missouri Police Department, 2014).
OCC has various terminology for case decisions: conciliation – informal resolution of a
complaint; mediation – informal resolution of a complaint through mediation; secretary/attorneythe secretary/attorney for the Board is appointed. There are six categories for alleged improper
actions:
 bias-based policing – police actions were based on the race, ethnicity, gender, age,
sexual orientation, religious beliefs, disabilities or national origin of a person;
 discourtesy – actions in violation of the Code of Ethics and Rules of Conduct, for
example, racial slurs;
 excessive use of force – police used more force than is reasonably necessary to arrest a
suspect;
 harassment – repeated contact with a person without lawful police justification;
improper member conduct – when the behavior of a department member was
unprofessional, unjustified, beyond the scope of the authority of the member;
 improper procedure – when an administrative or procedural requirement was not met
(Kansas City, Missouri Police Department, 2014).

Additionally, OCC has specific designations for their findings:
 exonerated – alleged act occurred but there was no misconduct on the part of the
department member;
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 not sustained – evidence fails to prove that misconduct happened;
 sustained – evidence proves the act occurred and was without lawful police
justification;
 unfounded – alleged act did not occur.

Other options are:
 closed – complaint was closed for various reasons, i.e., pending litigation or lack of
jurisdiction;
 non-cooperation- complainant did not cooperate;
 resolved without investigation – a complaint that was resolved through mediation or
another method;
 withdrawn – complainant did not want to pursue the complaint (Kansas City Missouri
Police Department, 2014).

Although most complaints do not result in disciplinary measures being taken against
officers, in the three-year period beginning July 1, 2016 and ending June 30, 2019, 247
complaints resulted in disciplinary actions. 45 percent of these actions involved required
counseling for officers. 24 percent of these actions were letters of reprimand; another 24 percent
resulted in suspensions. In only 6 percent of cases were officers terminated, and demotions
occurred in 1 percent of cases (see Table 5.1 below).
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Table 5.1: Disciplinary Actions by KCPD, July 2016- June 2019

Jul–Sep, 16

Termination
3

Oct–Dec, 16

2

Jan–Mar, 17

2

5

8

13

1
1

2
7
4
4
2
5

4
6
2
4
3
4

15
4
3
5
4
7

Oct–Dec, 18
3
6
4
Jan–Mar, 19
1
8
8
Apr–Jun, 19
2
4
3
Source: B. Ruoff, Kansas City Police Department, July 30, 2019

11
16
9

Apr–Jun, 17
Jul–Sep 17
Oct–Dec 17
Jan–Mar 18
Apr–Jun, 18
Jul–Sep, 18

Demotion
2

5

Reprimand
10

Counseling
11

7

3

14

26
28
21
17
9
13
10

Suspension

Total
31

17
24
33
18

Figure 5.2 below tracks the total number of complaints received either by KCPD or OCC
during the period beginning July 2016 and ending June 2019. It also tracks the disciplinary
actions taken against KCPD officers over the same time frame. The two series are weakly
correlated (r=.27).
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Sources: B. Ruoff, Kansas City Police Department, July 30, 2019; K. Williams, Office of Community Complaints,
November 15, 2019.

Figure 5.2: Citizen Complaints and Police Disciplinary Actions, July 2016-June 2019

From July 2016 through December 2017 there is a downward trend in disciplinary
actions. On August 15, 2017, Rick Smith was sworn in as KCPD’s 45 th Chief of Police. Shortly
after Chief Smith’s arrival there is an upward trend in disciplinary actions. However, in the
period April-June 2019, there is a noticeable drop in disciplinary actions. This appears to
coincide with a reduction in citizen complaints. In a telephone interview with Chief Smith
conducted November 19, 2019, the Chief suggested that officers “had gotten the message” and
were acting in a more professional manner.
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Chief Smith has embraced a trend that may help to improve police-community relations:
the hiring of social workers. On becoming Chief, Smith hired one social worker and by the end
of 2019 there were six. The plan is for these six social workers to become full time in 2020. The
idea is that police officers can call these workers when they need assistance with residents who
require specialized attention. According to the Chief,
When our officers have a situation involving an individual or family who needs
long-term or special assistance, the officers engage our social workers. Social
workers have the time and resources to help individuals and families make longterm changes for the better. We have seen their interactions truly change lives,
build trust, and set an example for others. In addition to assisting community
members, this partnership has projected policing in a very positive sense and the
community has responded with more respect for our officers (R. Smith, Kansas
City Police Chief, personal communication, October 3, 2019).

Hiring social workers to work with police is not unique to Kansas City—it is a national
trend. Whether this measure is successful, it certainly suggests that Chief Smith is receptive to
reform and is intent on improving the relationship between his department and the community it
serves.

The Survey
In order to learn more about the OCC and how it is regarded by officials, complainants, and
police, I conducted an online survey (using the Qualtrics platform). The populations surveyed
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were: 1) relevant officials, including OCC staff, the mayor and members of City Council, and
members of the Board of Police Commissioners; 2) complainants over the last five years for
whom email addresses could be obtained; and 3) all current officers of the KCPD. All contacts,
including two reminders, were sent by email. KCPD staff distributed the survey through their
internal database to all police officers, and this was accomplished four times. Respondents were
anonymous, but did self-report their race, gender and position in the community.
Unfortunately, neither the mayor nor the members of the city council responded to the
survey (although I was able to interview two members of the council). Nor did anyone on the
Board of Police Commissioners answer the survey (but I was able to interview four former
members of the Board and one current member). On the other hand, all five members of the
OCC responded to the survey. Thus, the response rate from public officials was 23 percent (see
Table 5.2 below), but 100 percent from OCC. Henceforth, in the analysis, I will compare OCC
responses (as opposed to “officials”) to the other groups surveyed.

Table 5.2: Survey Response Rates
Group
Officials
Complainants
KCPD

Number Targeted
22
546
1,292

Number of Respondents
5
32
289

Response Rate
23%
6%
22%

As Table 5.2 above indicates, the response rate from the police was 22 percent, the same
response rate as for public officials. “Survey research is generally notorious for its low response
rates. A response rate of 15-20 percent is typical in a mail survey, even after two or three
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reminders” (lumenlearning.com, n.d.). Unfortunately, my survey of complainants did not
achieve this level of responsiveness; only 6 percent of those surveyed responded.

Limitations of the Study
Due to budget constraints, a mail survey to a random sample of all Kansas City residents was not
possible. This survey could have identified whether Kansas City residents: knew that OCC
existed, if they knew it existed, what was their opinion of its effectiveness, and whether they
perceived the police as being biased or abused their use of force authority.
Another improvement would be to survey and interview more complainants. Between
July 1, 2012 and June 30, 2017, there were approximately 2,392 complainants. Out of that
number, I had email addresses for approximately 546 complainants (information was provided to
me by OCC). Unfortunately, only 32 complainants responded to the survey. Of these, only
seven agreed to be interviewed. Had I been able to conduct a broader survey by mail, I could
have obtained more data from complainants and personally interviewed more of them.

Demographics of Respondents
As Table 5.3 below indicates, complainants are more diverse, i.e., more likely to be African
American and/or female than the police. The fact that police officers are overwhelmingly white
and male may well contribute to the lack of understanding between police and the communities
they serve.
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Table 5.3: Race and Sex of Respondents by Group
OCC

Police

Complainants

All Respondents

Race
White
African American
Hispanic/Latino
Other

40% (2)
60% (3)
0% (0)
0% (0)

76% (172)
10% (22)
5% (11)
9% (21)

54% (15)
29% (8)
7% (2)
11% (3)

73% (189)
13% (33)
5% (13)
9% (24)

Sex
Female
Male
Other

80% (4)
20% (1)
0% (0)

26% (59)
73% (167)
1% (2)

50% (14)
50% (14)
0% (0)

30% (77)
70% (182)_
1% (2)

Perceptions of OCC
Eighty-four percent of complainants were aware that OCC exists, yet only 56 percent expressed
an awareness of OCC’s activities. Because OCC has been active for a very long time, it is
surprising that some community members were not aware of its existence. Relatively few
complainants manifested an awareness of how OCC members are selected or when and where
OCC meets. However, 91 percent indicated that they knew how to file a complaint (see Table
5.4 below).

Table 5.4: Awareness of OCC by Police and Complainants
I am aware that OCC exists for citizen complaints.
I am aware of the activities of the OCC.
I am aware of how the members of OCC are selected.
I am aware of when and where the OCC meets.
I am aware of how to file a complaint against the police.
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Police
--81% (217)
33% (87)
27% (73)
---

Complainants
84% (27)
56% (18)
16% (5)
13% (4)
91% (29)

As shown in Table 5.5, most complainants do not have a favorable perception of the
process by which their complaints were addressed. Notably, they are no more likely to agree that
the OCC process is fair, as compared with that of the KCPD.

Table 5.5: Complainants’ Perceptions of Fairness in the Resolution of Complaints
Citizens receive a fair result when their
complaint is investigated by …
Agree
Not Sure
Disagree

OCC

KCPD

14% (4)
29% (8)
57% (16)

16% (5)
25% (8)
59% (19)

Figure 5.3, below, compares the perceptions of OCC across respondent categories. The
most obvious takeaway is that complainants consistently have a more negative view of OCC than
do the police or members of OCC itself. Complainants give OCC lowest marks for transparency.
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2.38

The OCC is an effective tool in representing community issues
about the police.

3.22
4.00

2.29

The OCC has effectively improved the community's well being
as it relates to KCPD's accountability and transparency to the
community.

3.15
3.80

2.28

The OCC effectively represents the composition of the
community.

3.00
2.80

2.41

The OCC is effective in recommending change in police
department policies.

2.94
3.00

2.21

The OCC is independent and autonomous from the police
department in dealing with the citizens' complaints against the
police.

3.73
3.80

2.40

The OCC is effective in improving relations between the
community and the police

3.14
4.00

2.07

The OCC is transparent in conducting its investigations of
citizen complaints against police.

3.22
3.40

2.27

The OCC makes KCPD more accountable to citizens when
they investigate citizen complaints.

3.59
4.40

2.17

The OCC makes KCPD investigations into citizen complaints
more transparent.

3.54
3.40

2.37

The OCC is effective in investigating citizen complaints against
the police.

Complainants

3.48
4.00

Police

OCC

Figure 5.3: Perceptions of OCC
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The complainant’s comments in the survey are also revealing:
 “I was pressured to have it [the complaint] investigated by KCPD, not OCC.
 “OCC makes it difficult to actually file a complaint and complete the complaint
process.”
 “One call to a complainant that is not returned in a day or so will result in the file being
closed.”
 “It [the complaint process] is designed to protect the officer and not the
citizen/complainant.”
 “Officers are found to not have done anything wrong in almost the majority of cases.”
 “After sharing on social media about the offense, a former member of the OCC
contacted me to urge me to file a complaint and explained how to do it. I would not have
known about this without her help.”
 “I have never heard of OCC.”

The police are moderately favorable in their assessments of OCC. The police are most
likely to agree with the statement that “OCC is independent and autonomous from the police
department…”, which they may or may not perceive to be a good thing. They are least likely to
agree with the statement that “OCC is effective in recommending change in police department
policies.” The following comments made by police officers who responded to the survey
suggest that the police think OCC is biased toward the complainant. And they think that the
OCC process of reviewing a complaint and making a decision takes too long.
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 “OCC complaints take entirely too long.”
 “The OCC has taken complaints with very little substance and turned them into major
conspiracies with the police being the bad guys for years.”
 “I have observed a definite bias against officers by the leadership of OCC in their
recommendations of officers’ actions, with regard to the action of white officers and
minority complainants.”
 “Members of OCC seem biased to minorities and reflect poorly on the police
department.”
 “…[W]e are not well informed on the OCC and how members are selected.”
 “While I believe the OCC is transparent to the community, it is not transparent to the
department members and is not trusted by the rank and file officers.”

Members of OCC are, on the whole, quite positive about the organization, but there is
one glaring exception: they do not believe that OCC effectively represents the composition of the
community it serves. The following comments were offered by three OCC members:
 “I think having an OCC Office in the Kansas City area has prevented our City and
police department from having the serious issues that other police departments have had
throughout the country. Citizens need an outlet to voice their concerns and grievances
and OCC provides that avenue. Also, not being under City control creates a very fair
process without political influence from the Mayor or City Council.”
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 “OCC provides a great service to the Kansas City community, never taking one side,
but always investigating what the issue (the truth) is between them and the officer(s). The
OCC office helps to bridge the gap between the officers and the citizens and building
trust, especially during mediation between the two individuals (officer and citizen). OCC
is a positive resource in helping to teach the citizens and children about police etiquette.”
 “Although investigations are done thoroughly, there should be an allowance for OCC
members to question complainants and/or department members in the course of the
investigation, if warranted.”

Perceptions of the Police
It comes as no surprise that, when surveyed, complainants manifest a low degree of respect for,
and trust in, the police (see Table 5.6 below). Nor is it shocking that they are much more likely
to agree than disagree with the statement that, “In general, police officers are biased against
minorities.” Two-thirds of those who agreed that police officers are biased also disagreed that
they respected the police. Clearly, the perception of bias is linked to disrespect and distrust.

Table 5.6: Complainants’ Perceptions of the Police
I have a great deal of respect for
KCPD officers.
KCPD officers are held accountable
for their misuse of power.
In general, police officers are biased
against minorities.

Agree
44% (14)

Neutral / Not Sure
16% (5)

Disagree
41% (13)

22% (7)

19% (6)

59% (19)

45% (12)

30% (8)

26% (7)
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Figure 5.4, below, displays attitudes toward the police in more detail; it also compares
attitudes across the three groups of respondents. Complainants are much more negative about
the police than are the police themselves, which is not surprising. It is noteworthy that, on every
item in Figure 5.3, members of OCC are more favorable to the police than are complainants.
Indeed, on most items, OCC members are closer to the police than to complainants. However,
there is two notable exceptions. First, OCC members are more likely to agree with
complainants that “KCPD officers cover up abuses of their fellow officers.” Second, OCC
members are more likely to agree with complainants that “KCPD officers take advantage of their
position of power.”
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2.07

KCPD officers are hesitant to use force because of the possible
impact on their career.

3.92

3.
2.93

An officer's career can be negatively affected by civilian
complaints.

4.13

3.5
2.64

KCPD officers are afraid of being punished for making an
honest mistake.

3.99
3.75

2.26

KCPD officers treat everyone objectively without considering
race, gender, age, religion or sexual orientation.

3.86

2.75
2.61

KCPD officers treat all racial and ethnic groups fairly.

3.97

3.5
2.32

KCPD officers should investigate fellow officers because they
understand the job.

3.25

KCPD officers take advantage of their position of power.

3.59

3.86

1.86
2.75
2.04

KCPD officers are held accountable when they violate people's
rights.

4.15

3.5

KCPD officers cover up abuses of fellow officers.

3.86

1.82

3.25
2.5

KCPD officers listen to residents and understand the issues that
affect their neighborhoods.

3.5

KCPD officers are prone to use excessive force.

3.91

3.43

1.56
2
2.61

KCPD officers treat citizens with respect.

3.75

Complainants

Police

OCC

Figure 5.4: Perceptions of KCPD
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4.08

Police Perceptions Revealed in the Survey
As indicated in Figure 5.4 above, police officers who responded to the survey were most likely to
agree with the statements that “KCPD officers are held accountable when they violate people’s
rights” and “An officer’s career can be negatively affected by civilian complaints.” They were
least likely to agree that “KCPD officers are prone to use excessive force” and that “KCPD
officers cover up abuses of fellow officers.” The survey also asked police officers about their
perceptions of negative publicity. As showing in Table 5.7, officers were overwhelmingly likely
to agree that negative publicity surrounding the police has adversely affected their own feelings
about their job and made them more apprehensive about using force against citizens.

Table 5.7: Police Perceptions of Negative Publicity
Agree
Negative publicity of police has made it more
difficult to be motivated at work.
Negative publicity of police has made it less
enjoyable to have a career in law enforcement.
Negative publicity of police has caused officers
to be more apprehensive about using force, even
though it may be necessary.

Disagree

82% (194)

Neutral /
Not Sure
9% (21)

83% (196)

9% (22)

8% (19)

83% (196)

10% (24)

7% (17)

9% (22)

Figure 5.5 below examines police officers’ perceptions of KCPD by officers’ race. Not
surprisingly, there are substantial differences between the perceptions of African-American
officers and their white colleagues. Interestingly, though, Hispanic and Latino officers tend to be
closer in their perceptions to those of white officers.
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KCPD officers are hesitant to use force because of the
possible impact on their career.

3.97
4
3.86

An officer's career can be negatively affected by civilian
complaints.
KCPD officers are afraid of being punished for making
an honest mistake.

4.11
3.82

2.86

KCPD officers treat all racial and ethnic groups fairly.

4.02
3.8

3.19

KCPD officers should investigate fellow officers
because they understand the job.

4.11

3.33

1.91

KCPD officers take advantage of their position of
power.

4.1
3.68

2.73

1.68

KCPD officers are held accountable when they violate
people's rights.

3.68

2.09

KCPD officers cover up abuses of fellow officers.

1.67

3.45

2
1.42

4.27
4.25

2.59

KCPD officers listen to residents and understand the
issues that affect their neighborhoods.

KCPD officers are prone to use excessive force.

4.24

4.1

3.29

KCPD officers treat everyone objectively without
considering race, gender, age, religion or sexual
orientation.

4.09
3.98

2.32

KCPD officers treat citizens with respect.

Hispanic or Latino Officers

4.18

3.5
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Figure 5.5: Officers’ Perceptions of KCPD by Race of Officer
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It is noteworthy that when police were asked about whether they cover up abuses of other
officers, those who disagreed were predominantly older white males. Those who agreed were
more likely to be black, female and younger.

In-Depth Interviews
In addition to the survey previously discussed, I conducted a series of interviews with members
of the OCC, KCPD officers, complainants, City Council and current and former members of the
Board of Police Commissioners. The interviews inquired about police relations with the
community and about OCC and its role. As Table 5.8 indicates, most of these interviews were
with KCPD officers, as they were more willing to be interviewed.

Table 5.8: Number of Interviews by Group
Group
Complainants
OCC members
Members of City Council
Board of Police Commissioners
KCPD officers

Number of
Interviews
7
3
2
5
38

Interviews with Complainants
Complainants expressed skepticism about OCC but also a lack of understanding of its functions.
They also noted the difficult relationship between the police and the minority community and
expressed trepidation about dealing with officers.
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 “I don’t see the purpose of OCC because if you have a criminal background, you are
always wrong.”
 “I would also say that the level of cooperation; I felt that I was very much on the
defensive since it was very much up to me to prove myself versus having the support of
the people who are involved at OCC.”
 “Maybe it’s [OCC] a success. I think in my situation it was better to have it than not
have anything at all.”
 “OCC or any board needs to publicize more so the community knows.”
 “Boards [OCC] need to do a lot publicity and letting people know what their options
are if they think their situation was not fair and be more collaborative, and more
cooperative with the citizen when they are involved.”
 “There is still work to be done between police and the African American community.
The police officers fear minorities.”
 “The presence of the police is very visible, but what are they doing to help the people in
the community?”
 “I think they [KCPD] are as transparent as any other police department.”
 “The black community and the police don’t really get along. They are pretty wary of
police because we do have cases of people getting shot.”
 “Most of my interactions with the police haven’t been bad. I never followed up with
my complaint because a week after I filed it, I noticed the officer and his partner kept
driving by my home. I just didn’t want to be harassed.”
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 “I have to admit since I’ve been here the last 5 years the police have been pretty good.”
 “I believe that they [KCPD] are transparent. Even when they are following up on some
drugs, I have seen them be respectful.”
 “In the power and light district there is some racial profiling.”
 “Most white officers seem to be culturally aware of how to deal with African
Americans, particularly in areas of conflict.”
 “The community also needs to be engaged with the police, including the AfricanAmerican community.”
 “In public housing there is no snitching.”
 “When I tell people about the incident where the officer retired before the case was
investigated, we all wonder what would have happened to this officer if it was his fourth
or fifth incident with a resident.”
 “KCPD needs for the community to fully understand how things work.”
 “The officer’s manner put me so much on the defensive, his manner was so abrasive. I
thought to myself, here we are college-educated people with a family and full-time jobs
and we are being treated as criminals.”
 “I thought to myself, no wonder there is so much violence against the police because I
didn’t have much to lose. I would have ended up in the back of the police car if I had
said how ridiculous this was.”
 “My family including my kids have a negative impression of the police, based on
knowing what happened to me. My impression is forever changed, and when I see news
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stories about police misconduct, I think that they are a hundred percent right because that
is what happened to me.”
 “I did not know that they [OCC] existed. It didn’t seem to me at the time that there was
some kind of board or group that researched complaints.”
 “No, and I think it’s [KCPD] corrupt and some day that cop will go down for doing
something else corrupt which is unfortunate. In a city troubled by race relations, it’s sad
that a white woman is suspicious of her police department.”
 “The cops are at schools or libraries sitting in his car checking his phone, but they are
there to police the areas and not meet the people. I think that is a missed opportunity.”
 “It’s [OCC] been a total disservice to the community.”
 “If you file a complaint against an officer, the officer is made aware that you filed the
complaint and get the particulars about it. Then the officer will harass you. So citizen
oversight does no good.”
 “OCC needs to be independent from the police department, and not have IAU do the
investigations.”

Interviews with OCC Staff
While OCC staff members recognize problems in the relationship between the police and the
community, they are fairly positive about the role of OCC.
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 “OCC has been around 45 years, so it has figured something out that’s working.”
 “OCC and internal affairs may not agree on everything, but that doesn’t mean they
can’t work together and get it right.”
 “OCC needs to rebrand itself as a kinder, gentler OCC since in the beginning the word
was stay away from OCC, it’s some silent organization.”
 “If OCC and the department can’t agree on the decision, then they have a
reconsideration meeting. If they still can’t agree, then it goes to the board of police
commissioners.”
 “There have been some policy changes that have made it harder for OCC to sustain a
complaint. Some of the older policies were more specific as to what an officer can and
cannot do; and now they are grayer.”
 “Have we stopped all misconduct in the city by the police? No. So we are not
successful in that area. Have we given a voice to the people who feel they have been
wronged? Yes. In that regard, we are successful.”
 “An officer told me that the community support for the police is at an all-time low, and
‘I am miserable out here.’”
 “You talk to some people and you ask them if they had a bad experience with police.
When they say no, I ask why they hate police and it’s because someone told him about
bad experiences.”
 “The relationship between the community and the police has never been so bad.”
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 “The people in the community say it’s horrible out there. These people are the gang
bangers, etc., who are telling me that it’s rough out there because we are hearing that the
police are backing off.”
 “Most of the stations now have community rooms with a gym, a community room for
meetings and things like that. That makes people more comfortable. To know that it is
there and that the police don’t ask anything of you.”
 “There are police out there who think that the people that work for oversight agencies,
whether they’re volunteers or employees, have not walked in their shoes, they don’t
know what it’s like.”

Interviews with City Council Members
Members of the city council offered divergent views on OCC and the police department.
 “I can tell you from my interaction with OCC, they are very responsive, they are out in
the community, they want to help as many people as they can.”
 “OCC is here to provide some level of accountability and so for that reason it seems to
work well enough.”
 “There are those in the community who I run into or go to community meetings and say
things like ‘we’ve gone through OCC, and they are no help to me’; ‘I can’t get answers.’”
 “If I go into my district in xxxx, there’s a high opinion of the police, there’s a high
opinion of the uniform.”
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 “I think that if you were to take the general population of the city, the police department
is looked upon very favorably.”
 “I can’t recall someone who has had a positive feeling to share.”
 “The reality of it is that in communities across this country, we continue to see the
tensions between police and the community.”
 “I’ve had people on the east side of the city when I suggested that we will meet at the
patrol division, they suggest not going there because people are uncomfortable going
there.”
 “Police need to get out of their cars and meet with the community.”

Interviews with Board of Police Commissioners
Again, we see divergent views on OCC and the police department. There does appear to be a
sense that OCC needs to be more visible in the community.
 “It [OCC] has been a success in making the police officers more accountable.”
 “OCC needs to pass out literature so that the community knows that it exists and what
it can do, do PSAs on the radio.”
 “Our OCC has limitations. They cannot discipline an officer; they simply make a
recommendation on the policy that was violated.”
 “It’s [OCC] not as transparent as we would like because if you are the complainant
unless you go to court you never know what happened.”
 “To continue to be successful OCC needs to be visible in the community, so they know
there is a resource to help them with complaints against police.”
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“People say they [KCPD] needs to hire more minority officers. One black officer
went into the chief’s office, put his gun and badge on his desk and quit saying ‘I
didn’t know they would be shooting at me.’”



“Mayors don’t want review boards because it is too political. Mayors want those
officers in uniforms standing behind them. No mayor is going to actively do
something against the police.”



“Some incidents are examples of how the police use the phrase ‘I was afraid for my
life.’”



“Majority of incidents have been against black residents.”



“In fact, the police board only has jurisdiction over a termination or suspension over
14 days.”



“Certainly in areas of KC, I suspect it’s far more racial minorities that feel oppressed
than white folks.”



“My personal opinion, a police department is not going to seem transparent unless
there’s an external body doing the investigating.”



“If I were chief of police of a major metropolitan area, I would have all female
officers. They absolutely talk first and have the ability to talk and not let it escalate
out of control.”



“That’s the biggest difference with KC, the board of police commissioners appoint
the chief.”
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“People think they don’t want to get involved, or they don’t think anything’s going to
happen. That’s the main reason people don’t complain because they think they’re
supposed to get beat up.”



“… so a lot of people in the community felt like, well you should hire your own
investigators. But the other side of that was, will the police cooperate? If you’re
trying to investigate something and they see internal affairs coming, no one likes
internal affairs. There’s a different standard on lying to internal affairs vs. lying to
you and me.”



“So internal affairs just do the facts. Sometimes you must stay on them to move the
cases. You don’t want cases hanging on and on.”



“There is nobody in the press that publishes at the end of the year any of the facts like
how many [complaints] were substantiated.”



“You have good relations [with the African-American community] until something
happens. The law has changed in Missouri, not only can you carry a concealed
weapon, you can carry any kind of weapon. Now that more people have guns, the
police aren’t that ready to shoot.”



“It is through engagement with the community and it is through building relationships
and whether they are walking the streets, getting out of the car and going to meetings,
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being available before and after church services, being available before and after
neighborhood association meetings, getting involved with youth groups, schools.”


“It's incumbent on law enforcement to find out what is the best way to engage with a
community and make the community a safer place.”



“So many guys I grew up with are either in the penitentiary or dead. I went on a ridealong when I was on the board and I have so much empathy for these officers; no way
I could do that job.”



“I am still concerned about internal affairs doing the investigatory part of process.”

Interviews with KCPD Officers
Of the 289 police officers who responded to the survey, 69 (24%) agreed to be interviewed. My
impression was that the officers were eager to share their viewpoints, which they felt were not
being fairly represented in the media.
By and large, police officers manifested skepticism about the OCC and its procedures.
Interviews with the police are consistent with the survey results about OCC not being effective
regarding complaints. The police know that internal affairs conducts the actual investigation of
the facts from the complaints, and they perceive OCC as being biased against officers when they
apply policies and procedures to the action of the officer.
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 “Having an entity like OCC to investigate any part of the police department is nothing
other than a PR tool to say investigations are transparent.”
 “I believe OCC is entirely too concerned with just giving citizens what they want
unless it is impossible to do so.”
 “…due to poor decisions made by OCC in sustaining complaints not due to evidence,
but due to their dislike for a particular officer.”
 “KCPD commanders used OCC complaints as a means of putting pressure on officers
even if some complaints were unfounded.”
 “Most OCC members are way too close to the command staff of the police
department.”
 “The additional review of complaints by OCC was more fluff than substance.”
 “OCC used the number of complaints, including those found to be false, against
officers by including the total number of complaints filed when making recommendations
to the Police Board about disciplinary action”
 “Based on my interaction with OCC personnel [having worked in internal affairs for 3
years], it was my impression they went into each case with a presumption of guilt against
the officer, rather than the presumption of innocence, which is the cornerstone of the
criminal justice system.”
 “OCC complaints take entirely too long. The resolutions should be quick both for the
sake of the citizen and the officer.”
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The officers expressed concern about false complaints made against the police. They are
frustrated with having to spend a lot of time defending themselves when the complaint is false.
The officers’ opinion is that they will be reprimanded when they do something wrong; however,
there are no consequences for citizens filing a false complaint. Because there are no
consequences, officers have negative beliefs about OCC.
 “…because a citizen can walk into OCC and say I am a racist officer or I called them a
name, and I still have to go through the process, and when it is unfounded there are no
repercussions on the citizen for lying and making us have to stress and go make
statements, they are just free to go do it again.”
 “The OCC has taken complaints with very little substance and turned them into major
conspiracies with the police being the bad guys for years.”
 “It’s well known in the community how to get your charges dropped by filing a
complaint against an arresting officer. It’s no coincidence that complainants have
multiple complaints filed.”
 “What is done to citizens who falsify OCC forms and make bogus complaints against
officers? Nothing!”
 OCC never addresses the community member who is blatantly making false
accusations that are proven not to be true. The citizen is never held accountable for their
false allegations…”
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Not surprisingly, police officers tend to be supportive of the use of force as a reasonable
and necessary measure.
 “Ever-rising standards of what force is ‘reasonable’ with regard to circumstances has
defined almost every force tactic that police must use as ‘unreasonable’ or ‘unjustified’ in
an over-abundance of daily or common scenarios.”
 “Officers do not use force by choice; force is used by necessity.”
 “For someone to actually investigate a use of force incident they need to have been
properly educated on all the Supreme Court rulings as we have been and then at the bare
minimum be exposed to use of force incidents.”
 “The newer the officer, the more intimidated and responsive they are, to being
questioned or goaded. A more tenured officer has generally learned to let those things go
in one ear and out the other.”
 “It is important to remember that what is and what is not excessive force is a sliding
scale of reasonableness.”
 “It seems the more we progress, the more restrictive we have become with regard to the
use of force and police incidents.”
 “The rules of force are written so that those, especially in the field who are often
required to make decisions in a split second, have to stop their actions to consider way
too many factors before applying use of force.”
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Police officers manifested low morale and expressed particular disdain for how they are
portrayed in the media.
 “The culture of today’s street officer is to sit in the patrol car and answer 911 calls
versus put themselves out there doing self-initiated work, which is the backbone of
keeping the community safe. The fear of being in a critical incident and crucified on the
news…it’s not worth it.”
 “The media has ruined the careers of good police officers, with the false narrative
reporting.”
 “The department is struggling with keeping the morale up with district officers.”
 “The negative view of the police in the media has made officers hesitant to use force
when necessary thus resulting in more officers being injured or killed.”
 “In my 21 years in law enforcement, I have never seen the level of disrespect and pure
hatred towards law enforcement that I am experiencing now.”

In August 2017, the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) office of the U.S.
Justice Department assembled a group of forty police officers to discuss concerns about morale.
When asked why there is low morale in the profession, officers noted a lack of resources and an
expectation of officers doing more with less. “However, the issue that dominated the discussion
was the undercurrent of negativity law enforcement officers feel is coming from their
communities” (Robinson & Smith, 2018, p. 3). These officers believe that bad policecommunity relations is a significant reason why this negative perception exists. Certainly, this
attitude was manifest among the KCPD officers interviewed for this dissertation.
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Comparing the Similarity of Responses Across Groups
To assist in the analysis of the interviews, I employed NVivo, which is a program used for the
analysis of unstructured text. One of the functions provided by NVivo is the determination of
the similarity of responses by groups of respondents. Figure 5.6 below graphically depicts the
similarity of responses among the police, the complainants, and the members of City Council and
the Board of Police Commissioners. As the graph suggests, these groups have very different
perspectives. Interesting, though, it is the Board Members and complainants that are farthest
apart.
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Figure 5.6: Similarity of Interview Responses:
Board Members, Police, OCC Staff, and Complainants
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Figure 5.6 above disguises the within-group variance. For example, there may be a
tendency for outside observers to assume that police officers think alike. My interviews suggest
otherwise. To represent the variation of officer’s comments graphically, I employed the NVIVO
program, which generated Figure 5.7.

Figure 5.7: Similarity of Police Officers’ Responses to Interview Questions
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While there are many differences of opinion or emphasis among the officers interviewed,
here are two illustrative contrasts. First, let us consider the comments of P10 and P4, which
define the range on the vertical dimension. Officer P4 supports civilian oversight and believes
that OCC lends some semblance of fairness to the complaint process. In contrast, officer P10
believes that officers do not back civilian oversight because civilians don’t understand what
officers do. Officers P5 and P37 define the range on the horizontal dimension. P5 believes that
residents have erroneous and negative opinions of the police based on media coverage.
However, P37 opines that there are many opportunities to work with the media, build bridges
and communication so that there is more trust between police and the media.

Assessing Civilian Oversight in Kansas City
The Office of Community Complaints (OCC) has existed for more than 45 years. It has a simple
structure, a bare-bones staff, and very limited authority. Its function is to review determinations
made by the Internal Affairs Department of the KCPD in response to civilian complaints. It has
no subpoena power and can only recommend that officers be disciplined. Disciplinary decisions
are made ultimately by the Chief of Police, who serves at the pleasure of the Board of Police
Commissioners.
As revealed through a survey and follow-up interviews, OCC staff members generally
hold positive assessments of the role and function of their agency. That view is generally not
shared by complainants or police officers. Complainants, in particular, tend to hold very negative
views as to OCC’s role and function. Considering the close relationship between OCC and the
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police department, it is understandable that citizens could perceive OCC as an extension of the
police and, therefore, would rule in favor of the officer. Going forward, it would be better if
OCC had its own website so that citizens do not see it as merely an appendage of the police
department. If you search for OCC, you will be directed to the KCPD’s webpage which infers
that OCC is part of KCPD and not necessarily independent.
Police officers also are generally negative in their assessments of OCC, but for very
different reasons. Officers tend to believe that OCC is biased against them. In general, police
officers manifested low morale. They tend to believe that their position is not well understood
and that they are often unfairly vilified in the media.
Although there are no perfect structures for a citizen review board, Kansas City’s OCC
has developed a reasonably efficient and effective process for managing complaints. Whether
OCC has improved the transparency and accountability, and ultimately the legitimacy, of the
police is far from clear.
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CONCLUSION
“Across the nation, in the wake of highly-publicized events, it is an important and
evolving time for law enforcement. Agencies face increased scrutiny from the
media, as well as the communities they serve, presenting new challenges and
opportunities” (Police Foundation, 2016, p.3).

As the Nation has witnessed, minority communities across the country have demonstrated, both
violently and peacefully, against police abuse. The Trump Administration, which has
consistently supported the police, has even threatened to retaliate against communities that
demonstrate their displeasure with law enforcement. In a recent Justice Department ceremony to
honor police officers, Attorney General William Barr said that “if communities don’t give that
support and respect, they might find themselves without the police protection they need”
(Elfrink, 2019, para. 2). Barr has also halted any pattern-or-practice discrimination suits from
being filed by the Justice Department and has attacked Philadelphia and St. Louis district
attorneys for instituting accountability measures (Elfrink, 2019). This high-level lack of support
for accountability has the potential to be a major hindrance to reform efforts across the nation.

Police Attitudes in the 21st Century
Police attitudes stem from a crime control culture that has evolved over many decades. The
police tend to believe that they need to demonstrate their authority in order to engender respect
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of citizens. Police officers are molded by the attitudes and perceptions of other officers as well
as the department’s leadership. The decisions that cops make in dealing with the citizens they
encounter are based on their judgments as to which people need to be treated more harshly
(Bayley et al., 2015).
Policing in the 21st Century has drastically changed with new technologies, terrorism,
new crimes, and diverse communities. Police leaders need a different mindset and skills than
those applied 20 years ago (Flynn & Herrington, 2015).
In addition to reducing crime, police leadership needs to address the problem of new
officers becoming disillusioned, mainly because they become discouraged by the leadership and
internal workings of the department. For the most part, police leadership is still based on the
para-military structure, and what is needed in the 21 st century is forward-thinking leadership that
understands the changing times. Veteran officers need to realize that they, as well as the rank and
file, should participate in ongoing training to lead in the 21 st century.
Police leadership can benefit from the Police-Citizen Interaction (PCI) Survey which is
conducted by the National Police Research Platform and measures the quality of police-citizen
encounters at the local level. Although police will instill trust in communities as they solve and
prevent crime, they will foster greater legitimacy when these communities believe that they
engage in fair procedures (Rosenbaum, Lawrence, Hartnett, McDevitt, & Posick, 2015). How
officers are compensated and promoted will guide officers on how to accomplish their mission –
protect and serve. How officers perceive their compensation and advancement will affect how
much they adhere to procedural justice (Schulhofer, Tyler, & Huq, 2011).
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Hiring and retaining officers has become a serious challenge for police leadership. If
there is an inability to hire quality officers, then police departments across the country will
struggle with enhancing police-community relationships. Across the country, interest in
becoming a police officer has declined significantly. For example, in Nashville, the number of
applications plummeted from 4,700 in 2010 to 1,900 in 2017 (Jackman, 2018, p. 1). In a
revealing interview with The Washington Post, Chuck Wexler, head of the Police Executive
Research Forum, recounted that “he asked a roomful of chiefs to raise their hands if they wanted
their children to follow them into law enforcement – not one hand went up (emphasis added)”
(Jackman, 2018, p. 1).
Police chiefs around the nation are members of the International Association of Chiefs of
Police (IACP) which produces conferences, research and networking. As IACP promotes the
policing profession in various ways, one goal is to produce safer communities on the worldwide
stage (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2019). In a rare moment, the president of
the IACP, Terrence M. Cunningham, announced to the 2016 national convention of IACP in San
Diego:
While we obviously cannot change the past, it is clear that we must change the
future. For our part, the first step in this process is for law enforcement and the
IACP to acknowledge and apologize for the actions of the past and the role our
profession has played in society’s historical mistreatment of communities of color
(Jackman, 2016, para. 6).
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Training of new officers is an important aspect of changing police culture. As Tyler and
Wakslak (2004, p. 279) note, “It is good to speak of ‘respect,’ ‘neutrality,’ and ‘fairness,’ but
what seems to us to be a necessary next step is work that identifies exactly what those terms
mean in the context of police-citizen interactions.” More research is needed to discover the best
means of training police officers on to how to interact with the communities they serve.

Transparency and Release of Information
A critical aspect of transparency is the release of information to the appropriate stakeholders.
Unfortunately, law enforcement has been reluctant to release data on dangerous police actions.
Citizens are more inclined to participate in their community when they have dependable,
transparent information, especially as it relates to law enforcement. “Further, transparency
strengthens, and the perception of secrecy weakens, public confidence and trust in law
enforcement” (Brechner Center for Freedom of Information, 2018, p. 5).
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) allows the public, especially the media, access
to documents that are in possession of a government agency. If citizens are legally entitled to
certain information and if that information will eventually be disclosed, it is judicious for the
police department to quickly reveal the information rather than waiting for the media to publicize
it (Brechner Center for Freedom of Information, 2018). Increasingly, due to litigation, courts of
law are becoming more involved with whether or not records, data, or other information are
allowed to be released. When California’s SB 1421 became effective on January 1, 2019, the
police unions attempted to have the court exempt cases prior to the effective date. However, San
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Diego’s Superior Court Judge Eddie Sturgeon mandated that these records be released, including
those prior to January 1, 2019 (Jones, 2019).
When there is excessive use of force, especially in cases of a fatality, the Internal Affairs
Department of the police department is the entity that investigates whether or not there is cause
for discipline. If discipline is required, the case is referred to the local prosecutor. Is this the
best avenue by which to search for the truth? “[A]sking local prosecutors to become adversaries
of their closest professional allies raises process-oriented and democratic legitimacy issues,
particularly in our racially-charged criminal justice system” (Levine, 2016, p. 1447). An
alternative would be to create an outside prosecution board, similar to a civilian oversight board,
but with subpoena power and the authority to decide if an officer should be charged (Levine,
2016). If an outside prosecution board were to be established, the selection process would need
to ensure that the people chosen are not biased toward either the police or victims.
In Brady v. Maryland (1963), the U.S. Supreme Court held that in a criminal case, due
process of law requires disclosure of evidence favorable to the defense. In Assn. for Los Angeles
Deputy Sheriffs v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the California Supreme Court
decided unanimously that law enforcement agencies do not violate California law “by sharing
with prosecutors the fact that an officer, who is a potential witness in a pending criminal
prosecution, may have relevant exonerating or impeaching material in that officer’s confidential
personnel file” (Assn. for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, p. 33). As we move forward in ensuring a transparent criminal justice system, Attorney
General Becerra noted that this decision is a step in the right direction (Dolan, 2019).
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Gag orders are legal maneuvers by which attorneys persuade judges to mandate that
certain information in a legal proceeding should not be published or released. The original intent
of the gag order was to ensure that defendants had a fair trial and no prejudicial information was
released (Geragos, et al., 2017). Since there are no firm rules regarding when, or when not, to
issue a gag order, judges must manage each trial on its merits. Gag orders are also utilized at the
conclusion of a trial or settlement so that all parties are restrained from revealing any specifics
about the settlement. This occurs frequently in cases of wrongful death by police.
In Overbey v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, the plaintiff argued that a gag order
violated her First Amendment rights. Although she signed the gag order, she was later
denigrated by people’s comments on a blog at which point she defended herself, in violation of
the gag order. Because she commented, the Baltimore Police Department did not allow her to
receive half of her settlement. However, on July 11, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth District “ruled that the City’s practice of requiring non-disclosure agreements, or
“gag orders,” on people settling police misconduct cases brought against the Baltimore Police
Department (BPD) violates the First Amendment” (ACLU of Maryland, 2019, para. 4). This
verdict was an impressive win for free speech, especially for the minority residents of Baltimore
who are usually the survivors of police abuse. It is too soon to predict whether this milestone
will reach other communities.
The Overbey decision prompted legislative action by the City of Baltimore. Championed
by Councilmember Shannon Sneed, the Baltimore city council passed an ordinance entitled
“Transparency and Oversight in Claims and Litigation.” The ordinance, which went into effect
on January 1, 2020, provides:
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For the purpose of requiring the Baltimore City Department of Law to post on its
website certain claims against Baltimore City regarding police misconduct and
unlawful discrimination; requiring the Baltimore City Department of Law to
report to the City Council on certain litigation involving Baltimore City;
prohibiting the Baltimore City Department of Law from approving certain
settlement agreements that require claimants to waive certain rights; prohibiting
the Board of Estimates from approving for execution certain settlement
agreements that require claimants to waive certain rights; defining certain terms;
and generally relating to improved transparency and oversight of claims against
Baltimore City (Baltimore City Council, Legislation, 2019).

The Role of Police Unions
As noted frequently in previous chapters, police unions represent an impediment to reform.
When a police chief fires an officer for misconduct, it is likely that the officer will eventually
have his job reinstated as the result of union intervention. For example, in the past eight years,
Florida attorney Gene Gibbons has successfully had over 22 officers reinstated to their jobs,
despite the chiefs having fired them (Bennett & Sullivan, 2017). Since 2006, a Washington Post
report which covered 37 of the largest cities identified more than 1,881 officers were fired, and
451 of them were rehired due to arbitrators’ decisions. The 37 departments noted one common
factor in these rehirings – contracts drafted by police unions (Kelly, Lowery, & Rich, 2017).
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During the 1960s, states allowed public workers the right to collective bargaining, which
included salary negotiation. At this point, police unions spread rapidly and were successful in
negotiating multiyear contracts. These contracts “ensured that discipline may be appealed –
typically through arbitration…” (Kelly, Lowery, & Rich, 2017, para. 34). In analyzing 178
collective bargaining agreements, Rushin (2017) established that a significant number of these
agreements limit and interfere with measures meant to hold police accountable.
There needs to be more research on the relationship between state labor laws and internal
police discretionary procedures. Since the collective bargaining process is not open to the
public, states must amend laws so that the disciplinary procedures are no longer subject to
collective bargaining. Some consent decrees mandate that nonpartisan investigators should
immediately report to the scene of a serious use of force to obtain statements from officers and
witnesses. Officers should also be separated and not allowed to speak with each other (Rushin,
2017). However, many union contracts do not allow this process.
In San Francisco, some key changes to the use of force policy were introduced. This
policy would bar officers from shooting at moving vehicles as well as not being able to use the
carotid restraint (chokehold). The police union vehemently opposed this new policy and filed for
a preliminary injunction. However, San Francisco Superior Court Judge Richard Ulmer denied
the union’s motion. Since the union alleged the city refused to continue negotiations, Judge
Ulmer advised the union that use of force policies come under the umbrella of managerial
decisions (Weeks, 2016).
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New York City’s Police Benevolent Association is the largest union in the world. After
the tenth officer committed suicide this year—double what occurs in a typical year—Police
Commissioner James O’Neill and Terrence Monahan, chief of the department, determined that
hiring psychologists to be in the field and improving access to mental-health professionals would
be a judicious decision (Bellafante, 2019). Patrick Lynch, president of the union, advised
officers that “operating according to standard protocols could result in dismissals and threats to
personal safety” (Bellafante, 2019, para. 12). This warning is a way to suggest that the officers
should slow down on the job, and as a result, felony arrests had fallen by the end of August.
There is no doubt that police unions wield considerable power and impede reform efforts that
would increase accountability and transparency (Bies, 2017).
After the firing of NYPD Officer Pantaleo, who killed Eric Garner, a resolution of no
confidence in Commissioner O’Neill and Mayor de Blasio was unanimously approved by the
union’s delegate assembly (Bellafante, 2019). In addition to the no confidence vote, “felony
arrests are down about 11%, misdemeanor arrests are down 17% ... and … [there is] a 32% drop
[in citations] for moving violations” (Sisak, 2019, para. 2). What has been documented in New
York City may well be taking place in Kansas City. KCPD officers, both in their response to the
survey and in interviews, said that many officers are no longer being proactive in arrests and are
being reactive to the calls that the dispatcher relays.

The Impact of Insurance Companies
Because insurance companies control police liability insurance, they play a role in reducing
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police misconduct. More numerous incidents of police malfeasance result in higher deductibles
that cities must pay. However, even though the deductibles may be higher, the risk of paying out
millions to an injured party moves from the city to the insurance company (Rappaport, 2017).
As has been noted in this dissertation, millions of dollars have been paid to victims of police
misconduct. Is it possible that insurance companies can effect change in police departments?
“What we see is that insurers transform vague, uncertain liability exposure into finely-grained
policies backed by differentiated premiums and the threat of coverage denial. That is a
substantial part of how civil liability deters misconduct in insured jurisdictions” (Rappaport,
2017, p. 1547).
Some ways that insurance companies attempt to reduce liability issues are: policy
development (ensuring that police departments have adequate policies), education and training
(providing new training and sharing educational materials), audits (going to the department to
ensure compliance with policies). Loss prevention is important to insurance companies which
explains their interest in requiring that police departments ensure that their policies adhere to
constitutional requirements. For example, insurance companies will be particularly interested in
the policies involving use of force and vehicle hot pursuit (Rappaport, 2017).
Many police departments, like Chicago, IL, and Kansas City, MO, have chosen the path
of self-insurance or have joined a pool which is created by a group of cities to share the financial
risk (Rappaport, 2017). Chicago and Kansas City are both self-insured. In 2013, a comparison
of many police departments outlined the percent of the police budget that was allocated to
insurance premiums for the police. For Chicago, that percent was 3.92% whereas for Kansas
City it was 1.18% (Rappaport, 2017, p. 1560). According to the 2013 census numbers for
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population, Kansas City is 17% smaller than Chicago; but when looking at budgets for insurance,
Chicago is 30% higher than Kansas City.

Police Expertise
The police are perceived as being society’s protector from crime and, in the case of a
catastrophic event, the leaders who will attempt to ensure the safety of citizens. Police
understand and know how to deal with criminals since they are the experts. Starting in the
1950s, there was a movement to professionalize the police and with that came the concept of
police as professionals with expert knowledge and training. Judges quickly learned that the
police could assist in a myriad of ways, like analyzing probable cause. With the embrace of
police professionalism, what soon occurred was “structural spillover: a process by which
different areas of the law impact each other through not only their substantive content, but also
their procedural logistics and often inadvertent analytic effects” (Lvovsky, 2017, p. 2002-2003).
To the police, professionalism meant being considered an expert as they had specialized training
and education to support this statement.
Judicial deference to the police as experts is seen vividly in the Supreme Court case of
Terry v. Ohio, 393 U.S. 1 (1958). Terry was a landmark decision in that police do not violate a
person’s Fourth Amendment rights when they stop someone, question and possibly frisk him
without probable cause to arrest (Mackey, 2019). When judges dealt with investigatory stops,
judges leaned on police expertise as it related to the Fourth Amendment (Lvovsky, 2017).
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When police accountability is a concern, the reliance on police testimony can be an
impediment to that accountability. In a New York City case, Officer Daniel Nunez stopped
driver Mr. Hill, said he smelled marijuana, searched the car, photographed the marijuana (which
the judge said was likely staged) and found a gun in the trunk. Judge April Newbauer is the first
judge to challenge police deference and in a scathing opinion said “the time has come to reject
the canard of marijuana from nearly every vehicle subject to a traffic stop. So ubiquitous has
police testimony about odors from cars become that it should be subject to a heightened level of
scrutiny if it is to supply the grounds for a search” (Goldstein, 2019, paras. 4,5).

Structural Reform Litigation (SRL)
Structural reform litigation (SRL) refers to a lawsuit that seeks a judicial order or consent decree
to force structural change in a police department. SRL is based on the concept that police
departments, not lone officers, are responsible for a culture that condones violence and fails to
respond to wrongdoing. SRLs have led to “many of the nation’s largest police departments
including Los Angeles, Detroit, Seattle, Albuquerque, Newark, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati,
Washington, D.C., and New Orleans have undergone or are currently undergoing SRL” (Rushin,
2015, p. 1347). SRLs are a powerful tool to reduce misconduct (Rushin, 2015).
When consent decrees are established, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department
of Justice is the main organization that structures the agreement. Once the Department of Justice
has the evidence to prove a pattern or practice of police misconduct, the city and police
department enter into a federal court consent decree. Reform agreements began in 1997, and

135

many of these agreements are still active (Civil Rights Division, 2017). Although there have
been issues with compliance, for the most part consent decrees have been effective in compelling
cities to reform a police department. Four independent studies of consent decrees “provide
strong evidence that reform under the Division’s reform agreements generally succeed in
bringing about more effective constitutional policing practices and improved police-community
relations” (Civil Rights Division, 2017, p. 38).
However, the Trump administration has hindered reform efforts. One of former attorney
general Jeff Sessions’ goals was to radically reduce federal oversight of the police. He
denounced consent decrees because, in his view, they diminish police morale and because it is
inconceivable that there are systemic problems in police departments (Balko, 2019). Sessions
ordered the Justice Department to review all existing agreements to ensure that they are
consistent with President Trump’s goal of promoting officer safety (Horwitz, Berman, &
Lowery, 2017). Jonathan Smith, executive director of the Washington Lawyers’ Committee for
Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, was aghast at Sessions’ order and said that “this raises the
question of whether, under the current attorney general, the Department of Justice is going to
walk away from its obligation to ensure that law enforcement across the country is following the
Constitution” (Horwitz, Berman, & Lowery, 2017, para. 7).
Although there has been very little publicity, President Trump signed an executive order
on October 28, 2019, establishing the Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration
of Justice. President Obama’s 21st Century Task Force on Policing recommended the creation of
a commission that would be dedicated to criminal justice reform as well as national police issues.
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A similar commission was created in 1965 by President Johnson which resulted in the 911
system as well as additional police training. Civil rights groups and law enforcement have
solicited for such a commission to address extensive changes to the criminal justice system, some
of which include policing, rising incarceration costs, victims’ rights (Jackman, 2019).
Congress was developing legislation to create this commission which would have
ensured that the “co-chairs [be] appointed by the president and [emphasis added] congress and
required at least four law enforcement and two tribal law enforcement officials” (Jackman,
2019, para. 5). However, before Congress could finalize the legislation, Trump signed the
Executive Order which mandated that all facets of this Commission, including procedures,
composition, chairman, will be controlled by the Attorney General. Regrettably, there are a
number of impediments within this Executive Order. The Commission must complete its work
within in one year from October 28, 2019, which would be only ten months. When reading this
Order, there is a focus on “the need to promote public respect for the law and law enforcement
officers” (Federal Register, 2019, p. 58596) as well as many issues related to the police.
According to Walker, police reform has gained momentum, however, its success is not
ensured (Walker, 2019). Some examples of success are St. Louis, Missouri, Seattle, and
Sacramento, all of which implemented new civilian review boards in 2015. There are a number
of impediments that could halt future success, for example, police unions that continue to secure
contracts and state laws that dilute efforts to hold police accountable. Walker noted that “the
current broad-based police reform movement can be sustained by a vigilant, active, and informed
public, supplemented by a news media that digs below surface events and examines long-term

137

trends.” (Walker, 2019, para. 17) “Much has changed in policing in just the past few years.
And the result is that the prospects for genuine police accountability are stronger than ever
before. To be sure, success is far from guaranteed, but the building blocks for reform are in
place (Walker, 2019, p. 294).
Many police professionals have struggled with ways to stop the officers’ code of silence.
The consent decrees for Cleveland and Newark required these departments to “establish duty to
report and duty to intervene which necessitates that officers must report any use of force incident
as well as reporting use of force by another officer” (Walker, 2019, p. 125).

Effective Civilian Oversight
We come finally to the central concern of this dissertation: civilian oversight of the police.
Creating an effective citizen review board is a very challenging endeavor due to the many
variables – police department, police unions, mayor and city council, community members. To
date, there is no definition of what is an effective citizen review board because of these variables,
and the fact that each city is a unique entity that requires a unique structure. There are many
obstacles to forming an effective oversight board, but it is essential that a review board is
empowered to investigate police misconduct and ensure that discipline is enforced. Ideally, a
review board should be independent from the police department and local politics. One means of
achieving this independence is by establishing a fixed budget (Ofer, 2016).
There is a large body of information on review boards that covers
advantages/disadvantages, various models, and implementation. The National Association for
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Citizen Oversight of Law Enforcement has an abundant database of pertinent information
regarding oversight as well as conducting conferences and seminars. However, empirical
research on the effectiveness of civilian oversight is very limited, and there is no systematic
evaluation on board functions and outcomes.
To date, the actions taken so far have not improved public perception of police
accountability (Stephens et al., 2018). According to a 2016 CATO Institute survey, “46 percent
of Americans (including 64 percent of African Americans) say the police are ‘generally not’ held
accountable for misconduct, and 79 percent of Americans support outside law enforcement
agencies conducting these investigations” (Stephens et al., 2018, p. 27).
As more and more cities attempt to create civilian oversight of the police, politics may be
a significant hindrance. The mayor and city council, police department, police union, and
individual police officers will all have opinions on how to establish such a board, if at all, and
advocate for their positions. The citizens may have some input, but the politics will compel the
stakeholders to negotiate what they want/don’t want. The obvious choice should be to support
the structure of the board that is beneficial to the community, not any one entity.
Citizen review boards can only be effective if they are created with the intent of being
successful in the goal of reducing police misconduct. Although each review board is unique,
some of their weaknesses are limited authority, long delays between the filing and resolution of
complaints, as well as the collapse of holding department supervisors accountable. Merrick
Bobb, the Executive Director of the Police Accountability Research Center, has noted that a
“lack of expertise in police tactics, strategy and policy has prevented many review boards from
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effectively overseeing the police and has often resulted in boards agreeing with the police 90
percent or more of the time” (Hammonds, Moy, Suhr, & Vanderwall, 2016, p. 14).
It is imperative that a review board succeeds in its mission of reducing police
misconduct. Communities look upon these review boards as a way to ensure proper police
activities. Unfortunately if the review board is in a weakened state, the city would fare better
with no review board. Having a review board tells the community that there is independent
accountability. But if the review board cannot produce results for residents, then there is a high
probability of increasing community resentment (Ofer, 2016).
Civilian oversight of police is one way to limit police misconduct. However, the cities I
researched have had mixed success with oversight, especially New York City and Los Angeles.
In many cities, civilian oversight was either strengthened or created due to federal consent
decrees. The potential reforms listed below can have an impact:


Race relations: This issue has existed for decades, and it will continue to be until
society accepts the value of how all people, regardless of race, enrich the U.S.



Police and procedural justice: Police departments need to ensure that their officers
are adhering to procedural and constitutional policing. That directive will only occur
if the cities and police administrations develop a plan by which the rank and file
officers understand and are trained to do so.



Transparency and release of information: There have been many instances where
both the cities and the courts are mandating the release of police videos, personnel
files, discipline records, and other pertinent evidentiary documents.



Unions: Police unions have too much power, especially in the area of negotiating
lenient and favorable contracts to protect officers from being disciplined or fired.
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Cities need to negotiate contracts that will balance the need for safeguarding officers
of unwarranted discipline and the need for transparency in the release of police
records.


Insurance companies: As more lawsuits arise due to police abuse of power, insurance
companies will increasingly play an essential part in advising cities and police
departments to change procedures.



Police expertise: It is true that police officers have a very specialized job that
requires rigorous training. However, the courts are beginning to question this
expertise. With new laws requiring the release of police records, courts will have
additional information upon which to base any decisions.

As seen in New York City, body-worn camera footage can make an enormous difference
in the effectiveness of a review making the proper decision. However, access to this footage is
not always provided to the CCRB in a timely manner. In order to rectify this issue, a unique
development occurred whereby CCRB and the NYPD signed a memorandum of understanding
in November 2017 stating that: “…CCRB investigators will have access to an on-site, secure
facility where they’ll search and review body-worn camera footage directly” (Davie, 2020, para.
9). This memorandum eliminates the need for the CCRB to file a request to see the footage and
having to wait for NYPD to respond. This memorandum signifies how important it is for police
departments and review boards to compromise on sensitive issues in order to deliver more
efficient and effective police oversight.
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If there are measurable efforts to change or modify the above-referenced areas, it may be
feasible to envision an era of very little police abuse of force. The police are our line of defense
against crime and with that comes the responsibility to ensure that police officers are trained
properly and treated with procedural justice by the department. That could entail an infusion of
monies to properly staff a department and acquire more equipment. As a society, we need to
assure that the police are well prepared to “protect and serve.”
My research suggests that civilian oversight of police can be effective in improving
police accountability and transparency. However, the enacting legislation must provide
oversight agencies sufficient independence, staffing, budget, and political support to ensure they
are effective. Civilian oversight cannot be the primary method of restoring legitimacy of the
police. It will take the courts, unions, police administrations, city councils, and communities to
join in the effort of ensuring that the police are transparent and accountable.
With more transparency and accountability, citizens will be more informed of how and
why police do what they do. This can be a double-edged sword. In one way, the citizen could
learn about the how well the officers are handling their jobs with no misconduct. Or, they could
learn that there has been a massive spike in officer misconduct and it appears nothing is being
done to fix the problem. Either way citizens have the opportunity to learn what is happening in
the law enforcement arena and, if displeased, they can join like-minded individuals and attempt
change.
Based on this dissertation, some future directions and further research would include
police unions, insurance companies, police expertise as perceived by judges, and structural
reform litigation. Moreover, we need to better understand how training and socialization of

142

police officers can improve their commitments to the values of transparency, accountability and
procedural fairness.
Reflecting on what I have learned about civilian oversight, I believe that societal and
global advancements have impacted humans with such force that most institutions are having a
difficult time in grasping how they should adjust their interaction with citizens. Law
enforcement is no exception. The police began as part-time watchmen and evolved into today’s
police who have the latest technology and weapons. What hasn’t changed is the hierarchical
structure of top-down management, which is out of touch with the human aspect of being
respected for your profession, being respected by upper management, and being respected by
your community.
As shown in the interviews conducted with Kansas City police, officers are struggling
with the negative publicity, how to deal with transparency in all facets of law enforcement and
how to achieve a well-balanced life. It will take time, understanding, inventiveness, willingness
to change and, most importantly, being engaged with peers and superiors in promoting the
profession. It has been noted that “there must be an effective bottom-up as well as top-down
flow of ideas in any organization” (Quigley, 1993, p. 55).
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